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Why housing and transport costs should always be considered together: 
a monocentric analysis of prudential measures in housing access 
Nicolas Coulombel a,*
a Université Paris-Est, Laboratoire Ville Mobilité Transport, Bâtiment Bienvenue 
6 et 8 avenue Blaise Pascal, 77455 Marne-la-Vallée cedex 2, France 
 
Abstract 
This paper compares the effects of two prudential measures in housing access on the solvency and welfare of households, 
with specific attention to transport costs as well as equity issues. A widespread regulation is to cap the housing expense ratio 
(defined as the share of income spent on the rent or the monthly loan installment), typically at one third of income or so. 
Using the canonical model of urban economics, the monocentric model, we show that capping the housing expense ratio 
drives low-income households to move away from the city center toward suburban areas, where they face high transport costs. 
This unintended eviction effect lowers the efficiency of this prudential measure as far as household solvency is concerned. 
Capping the overall housing plus transport expense ratio precludes this eviction mechanism and unequivocally proves more 
efficient in protecting household solvency, including from strong variations in transport prices such as during fuel price spikes. 
Additionally, by limiting the bidding capacity of households, both prudential measures lead to a decrease in housing prices. 
This tends to improve the welfare of households, firstly of high-income ones (as they are less affected by the constraints). 
The effect on housing prices is stronger when capping the housing expense ratio, so that households, again firstly high-income 
ones, are typically better off (in terms of welfare) than when one caps the housing plus transport expense ratio, however. 
Considering the primary objective of prudential measures - protecting the solvency of households, firstly of low-income ones 
– our findings call for the inclusion of transport costs within prudential ratios, as well as indicators of housing affordability. 
This would incidentally raise public awareness with regard to the high costs of private cars, which are often underestimated. 
A short numerical application to the Paris region corroborates that a policy change from housing prudential ratios toward 
comprehensive housing plus transport prudential ratios might significantly improve the situation of low-income households. 
 
Keywords: housing, transport, budget constraints, monocentric model. 
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1 Introduction 
For homebuyer and private renter households, housing typically represents the primary cost item. 
In France, private tenants spent on average 19.3% of their income on housing in 2006, and recent 
homebuyers 22.8% (CGDD and SOeS, 2009). In the US, these figures reached 29% and 43% respectively 
for year 2010 in the case of moderate-income households (Hickey et al., 2012).1 Accordingly, lenders 
apply several prudential measures when considering mortgage applications to limit the risk of default. 
One of the standard underwriting guidelines is that the monthly installment should not exceed a given 
fraction of the homebuyer household income, typically one third or so. Likewise, in the private rental 
sector landlords often require from prospective tenants to earn at least three to four times the rent, 
again to ensure that the tenant has the financial capacity to sustain this rent level over the long term.  
These prudential measures, though relatively sound at first glance, are actually quite controversial. 
In tight housing markets, they would encourage households, especially low-income ones, to move 
away from the (expensive) urban center and to settle in more distant neighborhoods so that they can 
afford their housing wishes (homeownership, a bigger home …). Suburban and rural lifestyles involve 
high transportation costs, however. These transportation costs, often misestimated by households, 
would lead to a heavy housing plus transport bill and would ultimately increase the risk of insolvency, 
as argued by Hare (1994) in the case of the US or by Polacchini and Orfeuil (1999) regarding France.2 
Furthermore, the heavy transport costs of remote households make them especially vulnerable to fuel 
price spikes. In France, Montagnon and Ringenbach (2013) estimate that the share of households 
spending more than 60% of their income on housing and transport costs would rise from 3% to 60% 
were fuel prices to double. To avoid these unintended consequences, several researchers advocate 
the inclusion of transportation costs within prudential indicators (Hare, 1994; Holtzclaw et al., 2002; 
Polacchini and Orfeuil, 1999). Yet the relevance of their proposition remains controversial to this day. 
Empirical evidence on the issue remains mixed, and is limited by the unavailability of adequate data 
(Kaza et al., 2016), while theoretical works are seldom, if any (Chatman and Voorhoeve, 2010). 
This paper intends to shed light on this issue by studying the effects of the two prudential measures 
- capping either the housing budget or the joint housing plus transportation budget at a given fraction 
of the household’s income – from a theoretical perspective. Two questions are of particular interest: 
1) do these regulations improve the solvency of households indeed, in particular of low-income ones, 
as they are intended to and 2) how do they affect the household welfare. We use the canonical model 
of urban economics, the monocentric model. This allows us to capture spatial and equilibrium effects. 
                                                          
1 Moderate-income households are defined as households earning between 50 and 100% of the median income. 
2 Instances of households who misestimated the cost of remoteness are plethora and often relayed by the press 
(e.g. http://rue89.nouvelobs.com/2014/02/16/lerreur-petite-maison-village-640-euros-gasoil-mois-249978). 
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Indeed, because housing prices and transport costs strongly vary within a metropolitan area, setting 
constraints on the housing and/or transport budgets is likely to modify households’ location choices. 
Similarly, as both prudential measures limit the households’ bidding capacity, they are likely to cause 
a decrease in housing prices through equilibrium mechanisms, and thereby influence the solvency and 
utility of households. Acknowledging income as a key determinant of housing and transport budgets 
(Coulombel and Leurent, 2013; Haas et al., 2006), two household classes are considered in the model: 
low-income and high-income. The analysis focuses on the situation of low-income households, 
however, as the ones who face the highest housing plus transportation burdens and are therefore the 
most subject to solvency issues (Renne and Sturtevant, 2016). 
Our results corroborate the claims regarding the unintended effects of housing budget constraints. 
Capping only the housing expense compels low-income households to move away from the city center, 
at the cost of high transport budgets. If the constraint is too stringent, low-income households are 
completely evicted from the central parts of the city, entailing a strong deterioration of their solvency. 
Capping the sum of housing and transport expenses precludes this eviction mechanism and ultimately 
proves more efficient in protecting the solvency of low-income households. Regarding welfare effects, 
both measures limit the households’ bidding capacity and thereby involve a decrease in housing prices. 
This tends to improve the welfare of households, firstly of high-income ones (who are less affected by 
the constraints). The effect on housing prices is stronger for the housing constraint, so that households, 
again firstly high-income ones, are typically better off than under the housing plus transport constraint. 
Considering the primary objective of prudential measures - protecting the solvency of households, 
firstly of low-income ones – our findings call for the inclusion of transport costs within prudential ratios, 
as well as indicators of housing affordability. This would incidentally raise c  
The layout of the paper is as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature. Section 3 presents the 
monocentric model, and Section 4 preliminary results in the unconstrained case.  Sections 5 and 6 
investigate the effects of capping either the housing budget or the joint housing plus transport budget, 
respectively. Section 7 further explores the influence of transport costs. Section 8 carries out a short 
application to the Paris region. Last, Section 9 discusses the main findings and provides policy 
recommendations by way of conclusion. All proofs are sent back to the Appendix. 
2 Literature review 
When considering household solvency through the prism of housing affordability as we do here, 
two indicators prevail in the literature: the housing expense ratio and the residual income (Revington 
and Townsend, 2016). We discuss the two indicators and their relationship to prudential measures. 
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The housing expense ratio (also referred to as the housing burden, and as the front-end ratio in the 
underwriting lexicon) measures the share of income spent on housing. Typically, housing is considered 
unaffordable if the household  allows more than 30% of its income to housing expenses (Stone, 2006).3 
This simple rule-of-thumb is actually also often used as a standard prudential rule in the rental and 
owner-occupied markets. In the US, the threshold of 30% currently remains the standard in most rental 
housing programs (Schwarz and Wilson, 2008). Similarly, most current underwriting guidelines include 
a PITI (principal, interest, tax and insurance payment) threshold hovering around 30%. In France, 
landlords typically require from prospective tenants to earn at least three times the rent, while most 
lenders also use the 33% PITI threshold as conventional underwriting guidelines (Coulombel, 2016). 
The expense ratio indicator is straightforward to compute and easily available, which explains its wide 
use be it in the academic literature or in practice as a prudential measure. As a matter of fact, it is also 
used in other fields to study (domestic) fuel poverty or transport vulnerability (Berry et al., 2016). 
Furthermore, there is now large empirical evidence that excessive front-end ratios strongly increase 
the risk of mortgage delinquency, supporting the current underwriting guidelines (Kaza et al., 2016). 
On the other hand, ratio-type indicators are often criticized on the grounds that a same value of the 
ratio may reflect very contrasted situations depending on the household income level. For instance, 
households are less likely to be able to sustain a housing burden of 30% if they are near the poverty 
line than if they are well above the median-income level. 
In view of the limitations of ratio-type indicators, the residual income approach considers the 
income left after subtracting expenses relative to one or several budget items (e.g. housing), and seeks 
to evaluate whether this residual income is sufficient to meet the household’s (remaining) basic needs. 
While first works only subtracted housing costs (Kutty, 2005; Stone, 2006), there is growing consensus 
that both housing and transportation costs should be included in measures of housing affordability 
(Fisher et al., 2009; Hickey et al., 2012; Renne and Sturtevant, 2016). Like a same value of the housing 
burden may correspond to very contrasted situations depending on the income level, this holds true 
of the location of the household and of the transportation expenses that it faces. As a matter of fact, 
transport costs strongly vary within metropolitan areas, typically rising with distance to the city center 
(or to the nearest employment center for polycentric cities). For instance, in Philadelphia the mean 
transport expense ratio of a moderate-income household remained in 2010 below 20% close to the 
city center, but exceeded 30% in the most remote parts of the metropolitan area (Hickey et al., 2012). 
                                                          
3 While the precise scope of housing costs may vary, it typically includes: rents (for tenants) or loan payments 
(for home buyers), insurance, and taxes. Utilities and home maintenance are also sometimes included. 
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As housing burdens vary considerably less than transport burdens within most metropolitan areas, 
several works report that the joint housing plus transport burden strongly increases with distance to 
the city center (Berri, 2007; Coulombel et al., 2007; Hickey et al., 2012; Polacchini and Orfeuil, 1999).4 
To illustrate, in the Paris region the median-income household allocated on average 50% of its income 
on housing and transport in rural areas in 2001, against only 32% in inner Paris (Coulombel et al., 2007). 
Arguing that high housing plus transport burdens are likely to increase the risk of insolvency, the same 
works advocate including transport costs within prudential ratios.5 
 In the remainder of the text, we refer to the first category of prudential measures limiting only 
the housing burden as CH policies (for Capped Housing expense ratio), and to the second limiting the 
housing plus transport burden as CHT policies (for Capped Housing plus Transport expense ratio).  
 Whether CHT policies are truly preferable over CH policies actually remains a controversial issue, 
in particular due to the paucity of scholarly works (Chatman and Voorhoeve, 2010). A first strand of 
the literature examines the hypothesis underlying CHT policies that excessive transportation costs - 
like excessive housing costs - increase the risk of mortgage delinquency. Although recent works do 
corroborate this point to a smaller or greater extent (Kaza et al., 2016; Pivo, 2014; Rauterkus et al., 
2010), empirical evidence remains somewhat inconclusive and a few works actually find no influence 
of location accessibility on the risk of default (e.g. Blackman and Krupnick, 2001). Furthermore, all 
works are limited by the unavailability of the household’s transportation budget in home loan datasets, 
so that some accessibility measure (e.g. walk score, gravity index, number of vehicles) must be used 
as a proxy instead. Another strand of the literature investigates the effects of borrowing constraints - 
including the CH but also the down payment constraint – on tenure choice and housing demand. 
However, these works do not consider location choices as well as effects on housing supply and prices.6 
Similarly, transport costs are seldom considered. 
 This work extends the existing literature by investigating the effects of CH and CHT policies using 
the monocentric model. This allows us to consider the effects on households’ location choices as well 
as on real estate prices, two points rarely addressed in the literature. To the best of our knowledge, 
this paper is also the first to compare the impact of CH and CHT policies in a systematic manner and 
within a same analytical framework. 
                                                          
4 See also Nicolas et al. (2012) regarding the spatial trends of transport costs within metro areas in France. 
5Current underwriting guidelines already consider transport costs to some (minor) extent, as car loans payments 
are included in the overall debt-to-income ratio. However, the threshold for the debt-to-income ratio is typically 
higher than for the front-end ratio, and loan payments are but a part of the auto full cost. In the rental market, 
landlords seldom if at all consider transport costs to screen tenants. 
6 See Gobillon (2008) for a survey of the literature on this topic. 
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3 The monocentric model 
The monocentric model was first formulated by Alonso (1964), who adapted the seminal work of 
Von Thünen (1826) to an urban context. This model aims to analyze households’ location choices and 
housing price formation within a metropolitan area, while putting primary emphasis on households’ 
trade-offs between housing and transportation costs. Frequently used to study the effects of land-use 
regulations such as floor area ratios or urban growth boundaries (Bertaud and Brueckner, 2005; 
Brueckner, 2009; Turner et al., 2014), the monocentric model is especially suited to the analysis of CH 
and CHT policies, which bear on the very housing and transport costs that are at the core of the model. 
After shortly reviewing the monocentric model,7 this section presents the solvency indicators and the 
model specification that are used for our study. 
3.1. Basic principles 
In the standard monocentric model, all jobs are assumed to be located in a single point referred to 
as the Central Business District (CBD).8 Each household commutes to the CBD on a daily basis for work, 
and earns an income 𝑌. The commuting cost, noted 𝑇(𝑟), strictly increases with distance 𝑟 to the CBD.9 
There are three goods in the economy: transport, land, and a composite good.  The composite good 
stands for all other goods in the economy besides transportation and land; it is taken as the numéraire. 
To keep the model tractable, it is assumed households do not derive utility from travel. Accordingly, 
the household utility maximization problem writes: 
 
    max
𝑧,𝑠,𝑟
𝑈(𝑧, 𝑠)    𝑠. 𝑡.   𝑅(𝑟)𝑠 + 𝑧 + 𝑇(𝑟) = 𝑌, (1) 
where 𝑧 and 𝑠 are the quantities of composite good and of land consumed, respectively, and 𝑅(𝑟) is 
the unit land rent at distance 𝑟 from the CBD. When choosing its location 𝑟, the household faces a 
trade-off between accessibility (as measured by transport costs 𝑇(𝑟)) and housing prices (i.e. 𝑅(𝑟)). 
The gist of the monocentric model is that housing prices are set endogenously through a bid auction 
mechanism, and reflect at equilibrium the comparative advantage of a location in terms of accessibility. 
Travel cost savings associated to proximity to the CBD are therefore capitalized in land rents.  
Land supply is represented by a function 𝐿(𝑟) which measures the quantity of land available at 
distance 𝑟 from the CBD. Landlords can rent to either the agricultural sector or the residential sector 
(households), who compete for land. Landlords are profit-maximizers, and rent to the highest bidder. 
                                                          
7 See Fujita (1989) for a thoroughgoing presentation and analysis of the monocentric model. 
8 Several works lift this assumption (Brueckner, 1979; Legras, 2015; Ogawa and Fujita, 1980; White, 1988; Yinger, 
1992), but at the cost of great analytical complexity. See Breteau and Leurent (2010) for a review. 
9 Space is assumed isotropic around the CBD, so that only the distance 𝑟 to the CBD matters. 
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The agricultural sector is represented by a constant positive bid rent function 𝑅𝐴 ≥ 𝑂, whereas the 
household bid-rent function is noted Ψ(𝑟, 𝑢), with:  
 
Ψ(𝑟, 𝑢) = max
𝑧,𝑠
{
𝑌 − 𝑇(𝑟) − 𝑧
𝑠 |𝑈
(𝑧, 𝑠) = 𝑢} . (2) 
Ψ(𝑟, 𝑢) is the maximum bid price (per surface unit) that a household can offer at location 𝑟 and still 
achieve the utility level 𝑢.  Landlords rent to the highest bidder, hence: 
 𝑅(𝑟) = max(Ψ(𝑟, 𝑢), 𝑅𝐴). (3) 
Last, we consider the standard case of a closed-city with fixed population 𝑁 and absentee landlords 
(meaning land rents exit the economy). At equilibrium, all households have the same utility level 𝑢𝑒, 
hence the following conditions regarding 𝑢𝑒 and city size 𝑟𝑓 : 
 
   Ψ(𝑟𝑓 , 𝑢𝑒) = 𝑅𝐴, (4) 
 
∫ 𝑛(𝑟)
𝑟𝑓
0
𝑑𝑟 = 𝑁, (5) 
where 𝑛(𝑟) = 𝐿(𝑟)/𝑠(𝑟, 𝑢𝑒) is the equilibrium population density at location 𝑟. The first condition (4) 
states that at the city border 𝑟𝑓, the household bid rent function is equal to the agricultural land rent. 
The second condition (5) is the population constraint: integrating density within the city boundaries 
yields the total population 𝑁 (i.e. all households must be accommodated). 
3.2. Indicators of household solvency 
In the ensuing sections, we will consider three main indicators to describe the household financial 
situation: the housing expense ratio, the housing plus transport expense ratio, and the solvency level. 
In the monocentric model, the housing expense ratio is given by 𝜏𝐻(𝑟) = 𝑅(𝑟)𝑠/𝑌, while the joint 
housing plus transport expense ratio 𝜏𝐻𝑇(𝑟) = (𝑅(𝑟)𝑠 + 𝑇(𝑟))/𝑌 also includes the transport budget. 
Last, using the budget constraint from Equation (1), the quantity of composite good consumed by the 
household is 𝑧 = 𝑌 − 𝑅(𝑟)𝑠 − 𝑇(𝑟). It is the income minus housing costs 𝑅(𝑟)𝑠 and transport costs 𝑇(𝑟). 
Based on the literature review from Section 2, we can interpret z as the household’s residual income. 
Accordingly, we refer to the z expense ratio given by 𝜏𝑧(𝑟) = 𝑧/𝑌 as the household’s solvency level.  
A high value of 𝜏𝑧(𝑟) indicates a low risk of default (the household living at location r has a large share 
of its income available to meet other daily expenses besides housing and transport), and conversely. 
Using 𝑧 = 𝑌 − 𝑅(𝑟)𝑠 − 𝑇(𝑟), the housing plus transport burden 𝜏𝐻𝑇(𝑟) and the solvency level 𝜏𝑧(𝑟) are 
straightforwardly related by: 𝜏𝑧(𝑟) = 1 − 𝜏𝐻𝑇(𝑟). 
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In the remainder of the text, we use the monocentric model to study how the solvency level 𝜏𝑧(𝑟) 
varies with location for the low-income group.10 We first consider the unregulated (or unconstrained) 
case (Section 4), then the case of CH (Section 5) and CHT policies (Section 6). To keep the model simple, 
we do not explicitly model the situation of default – in which the household ceases to pay its rent or 
to reimburse its loan - and its consequences such as possible eviction.11 Rather, we consider that the 
equilibrium solvency level correctly captures the risk of default,12 but that the risk remains sufficiently 
low within the whole population so that we may neglect its impact on the equilibrium solution. 
Similarly, households do not take the risk of default into account in their location choice (i.e. the risk 
of default is not part of the household utility maximization program). This assumption is empirically 
supported by the work of Hanna et al. (2012), who show that households are willing to accept excessive 
financial burdens because they do not fully understand (or correctly appraise) the risk of insolvency.  
3.3. Model specification 
To simplify the exposition, we will now specify the utility, transport cost and land supply functions. 
This makes the algebra simpler while bearing little influence on the main results (except for the choice 
of the utility function, which is discussed below). We consider the Stone-Geary utility function: 
𝑈(𝑧, 𝑠) = (𝑠 − 𝑠0)
(𝑧 − 𝑧0)
1−, 
where 𝑠0 ≥ 0  and 𝑧0 ≥ 0  are minimum levels of land and composite good consumption, respectively, 
and 𝛼 is a preference parameter satisfying 0 < 𝛼 < 1. In the special case 𝑠0 = 0 and 𝑧0 = 0, 𝑈(𝑧, 𝑠) 
degenerates to a Cobb-Douglas function, and 𝛼 represents the fraction of income spent on housing. 
Although the Cobb-Douglas utility function tends to prevail in the monocentric literature (e.g. Anas et 
al., 2000; Kilani et al., 2010), the Stone-Geary utility function provides a more general formulation. 
More specifically, it allows us to specify basic needs for housing (𝑠0) as well as for other goods (𝑧0), in 
consistency with the basic needs approach used in the poverty literature (Galtung, 1979; Ghai, 1978).  
                                                          
10 The analysis focuses on the low-income group as the group with the higher risk of default (Kaza et al., 2016). 
Findings relative to the high-income group are not presented here for the sake of concision. 
11 Doing so would involve using a stochastic modelling framework, where households face random events that 
positively or negatively affect their financial capacity (e.g. job loss, child birth, unexpected expenses, and so on). 
The situation of default would arise in cases where the household faces such adverse events that it is no longer 
able to cope financially. Such a model would be extremely complex however, while not providing much additional 
insights compared to our simplified model. 
12 To be specific, we implicitly assume that the risk of default is a function 𝜑(𝑧/𝑌, 𝑌) that strictly decreases and 
is convex in both z/Y and Y. All other things being equal, low-income households have a higher risk of default 
than high-income households, and low solvency levels lead to a higher risk of default than high solvency levels. 
Convexity of 𝜑 implies that if two population groups have the same solvency level on average, the group with 
the greater dispersion of 𝑧/𝑌 has a higher risk of default on average than the group with homogeneous 𝑧/𝑌. 
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 We consider linear transportation costs, with 𝑇(𝑟) = 𝑎𝑟. In addition to making the algebra simpler, 
the linear specification was shown to produce realistic results for the Paris region (Viguié et al., 2014).  
The fact that transport is represented using a unique cost function does not necessarily imply that a 
single mode is considered. Rather, this synthetic cost function represents the average transport budget 
that a household faces when locating at a given location, be it by car, public transport, walk … 13  
 Regarding land supply, we consider a linear city with 𝐿(𝑟)  =  1. Again, this specification firstly 
intends to make the model more analytically tractable.14 It is eventually replaced with a more realistic 
housing supply function à la Muth in our numeral application to the Paris region (Section 8).  
 Last, two technical assumptions prove necessary later in the text. First, the income level must satisfy 
𝑌 > 𝑧0 + (𝑅𝐴 + 𝑎𝑁)𝑠0. Otherwise, households living near the city center (at r = 0) cannot meet their 
basic needs 𝑠0 and 𝑧0 and no equilibrium is feasible. We also impose 𝑧0 ≤ (1 − 𝛼)𝑅𝐴𝑠0/𝛼 so that the 
various expense ratios decrease with income, in accordance with empirical findings (cf. subsection 4.2). 
4 Analysis of the unregulated case 
This section reviews the standard unregulated (or unconstrained) case in which households freely 
choose their housing and housing plus transport expense ratios, with no upper thresholds on these 
ratios. As the standard unconstrained case has been largely addressed in the literature, all results from 
this section may be found in (or easily derived from) reference textbooks such as Fujita (1989). 
4.1. Case with a single income class 
We start with the simple case where all households have the same income 𝑌. The bid-max variables, 
i.e. the triplet {Ψ(𝑟, 𝑢), 𝑠(𝑟, 𝑢), 𝑧(𝑟, 𝑢)} solution to the bid-max problem (2), are given by:  
 
{
 
 
 
 𝑢Ψ(𝑟, 𝑢)
𝛼 + 𝐴𝑠0Ψ(𝑟, 𝑢) = A(𝑌 − 𝑧0 − 𝑎𝑟),            
𝑠(𝑟, 𝑢) = 𝑠0 + 𝛼
(𝑌 − 𝑧0 − 𝑎𝑟 − Ψ(𝑟, 𝑢)𝑠0)
Ψ(𝑟, 𝑢)
,                   
𝑧(𝑟, 𝑢) = 𝑧0 + (1 − 𝛼)(𝑌 − 𝑧0 − 𝑎𝑟 − Ψ(𝑟, 𝑢)𝑠0),
 (6) 
with 𝐴 = 𝛼𝛼(1 − 𝛼)1−𝛼 (see Proof in Appendix). 
                                                          
13 Following Anas and Moses (1979), it is possible to consider several transport modes in the monocentric model. 
Doing so allows to derive more realistic urban forms (e.g. finger plans), but at the cost of a much greater analytical 
complexity and for virtually no changes in the basics of the model. Indeed, whatever the transport cost function 
T(r) considered, one may always reparametrize the problem to that of a linear transport cost function by applying 
the following transformation to land supply: ?̃?(𝑟) = 𝐿 ∘ 𝑇−1(𝑟), where L(r) is the original land supply function, 
and ?̃?(𝑟) the equivalent function in the linearized problem (Arnott and Stiglitz, 1981). 
14 See Coulombel (2016) for an illustration of the (limited) role of housing supply in the single household case. 
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If 𝑠0 > 0, the system (6) does not have a closed form solution because of the bid rent equation, 
except for specific values of  𝛼 (e.g. 𝛼 = 1/2 or 𝛼 = 1/3). Notwithstanding, whatever the value of 𝑠0, 
the bid-max variables have the following properties as shown in Fujita (1989):15 
 the bid rent Ψ(𝑟, 𝑢) decreases with distance r to the CBD and with utility u; 
 the lot size 𝑠(𝑟, 𝑢) increases with r and u; 
  the consumption of the composite good 𝑧(𝑟, 𝑢) decreases with r.16 
As one gets farther from the CBD, housing prices decrease in response to greater transport costs. 
Given that housing is cheaper, households far from the CBD choose bigger lot sizes and conversely 
smaller levels of 𝑧 good consumption than households close to the CBD (Hicks substitution effect). 
Using simple assumptions, the monocentric model reproduces two widespread features of cities, 
namely that housing prices and densities both decrease with distance to the CBD (Anas et al., 1998).  
 Combining (3) and (6) yields the housing expense ratio: 
 
𝜏𝐻(𝑟) =
𝑅(𝑟)𝑠
𝑌
= 𝛼 +
(1 − 𝛼)𝑅(𝑟)𝑠0 − 𝛼𝑧0 − 𝛼𝑎𝑟
𝑌
. (7) 
The housing burden is not exactly 𝛼 as in the standard Cobb-Douglas case, for two reasons. First, 
the transport cost 𝑎𝑟 reduces the discretionary income, which mechanically lowers the housing burden.  
The basic needs 𝑠0 and 𝑧0, by setting minimum consumption levels for housing and for the composite 
good, also mechanically raise and lower, respectively, 𝜏𝐻(𝑟). 
The housing plus transport burden 𝜏𝐻𝑇(𝑟) is given by: 
 
𝜏𝐻𝑇(𝑟) =
𝑅(𝑟)𝑠 + 𝑇(𝑟)
𝑌
= 𝛼 +
(1 − 𝛼)(𝑅(𝑟)𝑠0 + 𝑎𝑟) − 𝛼𝑧0
𝑌
. (8) 
Last, the solvency level is equal to one minus the housing plus transport burden: 
 
𝜏𝑧(𝑟) =
𝑧
𝑌
= 1 − 𝜏𝐻𝑇(𝑟) = 1 − 𝛼 +
𝛼𝑧0 − (1 − 𝛼)(𝑅(𝑟)𝑠0 + 𝑎𝑟)
𝑌
. (9) 
Lemma 1  
In the unconstrained monocentric model, the housing burden decreases with distance to the CBD, 
whereas the housing plus transport burden increases (causing the solvency level to decrease). 
                                                          
15 Alternatively, these properties may be proved here directly by deriving (6) with respect to 𝑟 and 𝑢. If 𝑠0 = 0, 
the system (6) can be solved analytically, in which case the properties are readily seen. 
16 There is no specific result regarding the influence of u on 𝑧(𝑟, 𝑢). 
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Proof 
See Appendix.                        
Lemma 1 is in line with the intuition that some households settle far from the city center to lower 
the housing burden.17 Despite this, the household solvency level decreases with distance to the CBD. 
Greater transport costs in suburban areas more than counterbalance the lower housing costs, leading 
to greater housing plus transport burdens, and thus lower solvency levels (as 𝜏𝑧(𝑟) = 1 − 𝜏𝐻𝑇(𝑟)). 
The predictions of the monocentric model are in line with the empirical literature, as several works find 
that the housing plus transport burden does increase with distance to the city center (see Section 2). 
Figure 1 illustrates the above results for the following numerical application: 𝑌 = 1000, 𝑁 = 1, 𝛼 = 0.5, 
𝑠0 = 20, 𝑧0 = 100, 𝑎 = 10 and 𝑅𝐴 = 5.
18 
 
FIGURE 1: EVOLUTION OF THE HOUSEHOLD BUDGET ALLOCATION WITH DISTANCE TO THE CBD  
All in all, in the unregulated situation, suburban households are more vulnerable than those living 
near the city center, and doubly so: they have lower solvency levels, and face greater transportation 
costs to boot, making them especially sensitive to fuel price spikes.  
We now investigate how the analysis varies in the presence of income heterogeneity.  
                                                          
17 This result is relatively general and holds for most regular utility functions (Coulombel, 2010). 
18 While this numerical application aims to be representative of the general case and to illustrate our findings in 
a simple way, the parameter values and the resulting figures are by no means representative of real case studies. 
A more realistic application to the Paris region is carried out in Section 8. 
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4.2. Case with two income classes 
Consider two types of households: low-income households and high-income ones, characterized by 
superscripts P and R.  It is straightforward to show that for each income class, the variational properties 
of the bid-max variables and expense ratios remain the same as in the case with a single income class. 
The influence of income on the various expense ratios is provided by Lemma 2. 
Lemma 2  
In the unconstrained monocentric model, the housing plus transport burden decreases with income at 
any city location (meaning that the solvency level increases with income).  
If 𝑠0 > 0, the housing burden decreases with income near the CBD, then increases beyond a certain 
distance 𝑟𝐻. If 𝑠0 = 0, the housing burden increases with income at any location. 
Proof 
See Appendix.                        
If 𝑠0 > 0, both the housing and the joint housing plus transport burden decrease with income 
(except possibly within a second, suburban ring for the former). This is in line with empirical findings: 
several studies bring to light the marked decrease of the two expense ratios (H and HT) with income.19 
Conversely, the case 𝑠0 = 0 implies that the housing burden increases with income for any location. 
Although both cases 𝑠0 = 0 and 𝑠0 > 0 are considered in the remainder of the text, the opposition 
with empirical findings in the case 𝑠0 = 0 challenges the use of standard Cobb-Douglas preferences 
when considering income heterogeneity in the monocentric model. 
Considering differences in income, one might expect the wealthiest households to use their greater 
financial capacity to outbid low-income households and settle in the most accessible parts of the city. 
It is actually the opposite that occurs. Low-income households being more sensitive to transport costs, 
their willingness-to-pay to live near the CBD exceeds that of high-income households. This point is 
formally given by the following condition on the relative steepness of the bid-rent functions: 
|Ψ𝑟
𝑅(𝑟𝑃/𝑅 , 𝑢𝑒
𝑅)| < |Ψ𝑟
𝑃(𝑟𝑃/𝑅 , 𝑢𝑒
𝑃)|, 
where the subscript r denotes the partial derivative with respect to r and 𝑟𝑃/𝑅 is the border between 
low- and high-income households. As a result, low-income households live in a first ring near the CBD, 
while high-income households enjoy bigger lot sizes in a second, suburban ring (Figure 2). 
                                                          
19 See for instance Berri (2007) and Coulombel and Leurent (2013) for France or Haas et al. (2006) and Hickey et 
al. (2012) for the U.S.. 
THIS IS A POST-PRINT, THIS ARTICLE IS PUBLISHED IN TRANSPORT POLICY : http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tranpol.2017.04.011 
 
  13 
 
FIGURE 2: BID RENT FUNCTIONS AND THE RING-SHAPED CITY STRUCTURE 
The analysis of income heterogeneity has brought to light two opposite mechanisms regarding 
household solvency: the solvency level increases with income at any given location, but the spatial 
income sorting phenomenon implies that low-income households live in the central parts of the city, 
which improves their solvency (relatively to a situation in which they would live in the suburbs).  
Figure 3 illustrates the previous findings for the same numerical application as in 4.1 except that 
there are now two income classes: 𝑌𝑃 = 1 000, 𝑌𝑅 = 2 000,𝑁𝑃 = 0.5  and 𝑁𝑅 = 0.5. The first ring 
consists of low-income households, the solvency of which weakens as one gets farther from the CBD 
due to the heavier transportation burden (Lemma 1). When reaching the high-income residential area, 
the rise in income causes a discontinuous jump in the household solvency, which improves (Lemma 2). 
But again, transport costs entail a deterioration of household solvency with distance to the CBD. 
 
FIGURE 3: EVOLUTION OF THE HOUSEHOLD SOLVENCY LEVEL WITH DISTANCE TO THE CBD 
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5 Analysis of CH prudential measures 
This section studies the effects of CH policies using the monocentric model with two income classes. 
In particular, we seek to assess the claim that capping the housing burden would spur low-income 
households to settle far from the city center in order to fulfill their housing needs, and would ultimately 
jeopardize their solvency due to the high transport costs that remote locations involve.  
We first present the CH monocentric model and compare its main properties with the unregulated 
case treated in Section 4. We then study the influence of the CH constraint level on the welfare and 
the solvency of low-income households. Unlike the single income class case which can be treated 
analytically (see Coulombel, 2016), the case with two income classes proves more complex to handle. 
Accordingly, several findings are actually conjectures, confirmed over a wide array of numerical values, 
but which could not be proved in the general case. This limitation only concerns the CH case, however. 
As we will see in Section 6, in the CHT case the algebra is simpler and all results are properly established. 
For disambiguation, a hat symbol “^” will be used when necessary to refer to variables in the CH case, 
in contrast to the unconstrained case for which no accentuation is used. 
5.1. The CH monocentric model 
CH prudential measures are represented in the monocentric model by adding the following 
constraint to the household utility maximization problem:20 
 ∀𝑟 ∈ ℝ+,  ?̂?𝐻(𝑟) ≤ 𝛿𝐻 , (10) 
where ?̂?𝐻(𝑟) = ?̂?(𝑟)?̂?/𝑌 is the housing burden and 𝛿𝐻 the required front-end ratio, with 0 ≤ 𝛿𝐻 ≤ 1. 
Using the household budget constraint, (10) is equivalent to: 
 
?̂?𝑧(𝑟) ≥ 𝛿?̅? −
𝑇(𝑟)
𝑌
, (11) 
where ?̂?𝑧(𝑟) = ?̂?/𝑌 is the household solvency level and 𝛿?̅? = 1 − 𝛿𝐻. As transport costs 𝑇(𝑟) increase 
with r, the solvency requirement is essentially based on a threshold that decreases with distance r to 
the CBD. In the remainder of the text, we use the parameter 𝛿?̅? to characterize the CH constraint level. 
This leads to more intuitive graphic representations than with the parameter 𝛿𝐻: starting from 𝛿?̅? = 0, 
which corresponds to the unconstrained situation, the constraint becomes stronger as 𝛿?̅? increases, 
with 0 ≤ 𝛿?̅? ≤ 1 (whereas it is the opposite with 𝛿𝐻).  
                                                          
20 In the monocentric model, the question of who sets the CH constraint – whether it is landlords, lenders, both, 
or even households themselves – makes no relevance. For the sake of discussion, and as observed empirically, 
we assume throughout the paper that it is the capital owners (landlords and lenders) who implement those rules. 
We elaborate on this point in Section 9. 
THIS IS A POST-PRINT, THIS ARTICLE IS PUBLISHED IN TRANSPORT POLICY : http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tranpol.2017.04.011 
 
  15 
5.1.1 Constrained zone 
The constrained zone is defined as the set of locations where the CH constraint is active (or binding). 
Equivalently, it is the set of locations where the unconstrained housing expense ratio exceeds the 
authorized limit 𝛿𝐻 . 
Lemma 3  
The constrained zone in the CH case is a disk: {𝑟 ∈ ℝ+| 𝑟 ≤ ?̂?𝑐(𝛿?̅?)}. The outer boundary ?̂?𝑐(𝛿?̅?) 
increases with the constraint level 𝛿?̅?.  
If the minimum lot size is null (𝑠0 = 0), the outer boundary ?̂?𝑐(𝛿?̅?) increases with income 𝑌. 
Proof 
See Appendix.                         
The constrained zone is a disk centered on the CBD. For low values of 𝛿?̅?, the disk is small and only 
households living near the CBD (if any) are affected. As 𝛿?̅? increases, the constraint becomes stronger, 
until eventually covering the whole city (meaning that all households are affected by the constraint). 
The role of income on the size of the constrained zone is undetermined in the general case, however. 
If the minimum lot size 𝑠0 = 0, the unconstrained housing burden 𝜏𝐻(𝑟) increases with income Y 
(Lemma 2), and subsequently so does the size of the constrained zone, which is contrary to intuition. 
In the more plausible case 𝑠0 > 0, 𝜏𝐻(𝑟) decreases with Y near the CBD but increases far from the CBD  
(Lemma 2), hence the indetermination. When 𝑠0 is large, the size of the constrained zone will typically 
decrease with income, and vice versa. 
All in all, CH prudential measures firstly target households living in the central parts of the city, 
where housing costs are high. They induce a centrifugal force pushing households toward the outskirts, 
where housing is more affordable. The force magnitude varies with income in a non-trivial manner: 
low-income households are more impacted than high-income ones the closer one is to the CBD and 
the larger the minimum lot size 𝑠0 is. 
5.1.2 Bid-max variables 
Because of the CH constraint, consumption choices vary depending on whether the household is 
inside or outside the constrained zone. The bid-max variables are given by: 
 
{
 
 
 
 ẑ(𝑟, 𝑢) = max[𝑧(𝑟, 𝑢) ,  𝛿?̅?𝑌 − 𝑎𝑟],                                      
ŝ(𝑟, 𝑢) = min [𝑠(𝑟, 𝑢) , 𝑠0 + 𝑢
1
𝛼(𝛿?̅?𝑌 − 𝑎𝑟 − 𝑧0)
𝛼−1
𝛼 ],    
Ψ̂(𝑟, 𝑢) = min[Ψ(𝑟, 𝑢) , 𝛿𝐻𝑌/ŝ(𝑟, 𝑢)].                                   
 (12) 
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From (12) it is straightforward to show that ẑ(𝑟, 𝑢) ≥ 𝑧(𝑟, 𝑢), ŝ(𝑟, 𝑢) ≤ 𝑠(𝑟, 𝑢) and Ψ̂(𝑟, 𝑢) ≤ Ψ(𝑟, 𝑢). 
Because CH prudential measures limit the household bidding capacity, they lead to lower bid rents, 
smaller lot sizes, and conversely to greater consumptions of the z good within the constrained zone.21  
Figure 4 illustrates these various points in the case of our reference numerical application and of the 
low-income group for 𝛿?̅? = 0.4 and  𝑢 = 214.547.
22  
    
FIGURE 4 : INFLUENCE OF THE CH CONSTRAINT ON BID-MAX VARIABLES                                             
                                                          
21 This is for a given utility level. Because the CH constraint changes the equilibrium utility level of the city, we 
will see that CH policies may ultimately lead to larger lot sizes than in the unconstrained city.  
22 The value 𝑢 = 214.547 corresponds to the equilibrium utility of the low-income group in the single class case, 
i.e. when 𝑁𝑃 = 1 and 𝑁𝑅 = 0. 
(A) Lot size 
& z good 
(B) Bid-rent 
CONSTRAINED ZONE UNCONSTRAINED ZONE 
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5.1.3 Income sorting 
As discussed in 4.2, the location of each income class depends on the relative steepness of their bid 
rent functions. In the unregulated case, the bid rent function of the low-income group is always steeper 
than that of the high-income group. Thus, the former lives near the CBD and the latter in the suburbs. 
Because CH measures lower the household bidding power and because the effect varies with income, 
the relative steepness of the bid rent functions might change as a result, in which case the locations of 
the two groups could be inverted: low-income households would live in the suburbs and high-income 
ones near the CBD. This is indeed what we observe numerically when 𝑠0 > 0, but never when 𝑠0 = 0.  
This leads us to the following proposition and conjecture for the cases 𝑠0 = 0 and 𝑠0 > 0, respectively 
(as we could not complete the proof for the latter case) 
Proposition 1  
If the minimum lot size is null (𝑠0 = 0), the relative location of each income group remains unchanged, 
whatever the constraint level. 
Conjecture 1  
If the minimum lot size is strictly positive (𝑠0 > 0), the low-income group is progressively pushed 
toward the city outskirts as the CH constraint increases. 
Proof  
See Appendix.   
Figure 5 illustrates our conjecture for our reference numerical application (from subsection 4.2).23 
As the CH constraint becomes stronger (i.e. 𝛿?̅? increases), the bidding power of each groups declines, 
especially so for the low-income one. For high values of 𝛿?̅? (here 𝛿?̅? = 0.85), high-income households 
outbid low-income ones near the CBD, and the latter are pushed progressively toward the suburbs. 
For very high values of 𝛿?̅? (here for 𝛿?̅? = 0.875), income-location patterns are completely reversed: 
the high-income households all live near the city center, whereas all low-income households live in an 
outer suburban ring. 
                                                          
23 For reminder, the parameter settings are: 𝑌𝑃 = 1 000, 𝑌𝑅 = 2 000, 𝑁𝑃 = 0.5, 𝑁𝑅 = 0.5, 𝛼 = 0.5, 𝑠0 = 20, 
𝑧0 = 100, 𝑎 = 10 and 𝑅𝐴 = 5. 
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FIGURE 5: INFLUENCE OF THE CH CONSTRAINT LEVEL ON EQUILIBRIUM LOCATIONS 
5.2. Comparative statics 
Using the previous results, we investigate the effects of CH prudential measures on the household 
welfare (as measured by its equilibrium utility level) and the household solvency (as measured by 𝜏𝑧). 
As stated in Introduction, the analysis focuses on low-income households. In particular, we investigate 
whether the CH constraint does indeed protect the solvency of these households as it is intended to. 
To do so, we carry comparative statics: we study the influence of the CH constraint level 𝛿?̅? on the 
equilibrium utility of the low-income class, then on its solvency. 
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5.2.1 Household welfare 
The limitation of the front-end ratio induces two opposite forces regarding the equilibrium utility. 
For a given land rent level, households achieve a lower utility than when they are unconstrained 
(because the CH constraint – when binding – forces them to make sub-optimal choices). But because 
capping housing expenses limits the household bidding power, it has a depressing effect on bid prices, 
hence on equilibrium land rents, which tends to raise household utility (through an income effect). 
Depending on the relative magnitude of the two forces, the utility level in the CH case will be higher 
or lower than in the unregulated case. Like in the CH case with a single income class (Coulombel, 2016), 
we find based on extensive numerical analysis that the equilibrium utility of the low-income group 
remains constant if the constraint is weak (and thus ineffective), rises if the constraint is moderate, 
but decreases if the constraint is too strong. This leads us to the following conjecture: 
Conjecture 2  
As the CH constraint increases, the equilibrium utility of the low-income class remains constant at first, 
then strictly increases, and eventually strictly decreases. 
Again, Figure 6 corroborates our conjecture by illustrating the case of our reference model. While 
the same pattern is always observed for the low-income class, whatever the parameter values, the 
high-income class features two different patterns depending on the income differential. If 𝑌𝑅 ≫ 𝑌𝑃, 
the equilibrium utility ?̂?𝑒
𝑅 of the high-income group is constant then strictly increases. If the differential 
is moderate or small, the equilibrium utility follows the pattern seen in Figure 6: it is constant at first, 
strictly increases, but then strictly decreases if the CH constraint is too strong. 
 
FIGURE 6: INFLUENCE OF THE CH CONSTRAINT LEVEL ON EQUILIBRIUM UTILITIES 
Utility 
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5.2.2 Household solvency 
CH prudential measures seek to decrease the risk of insolvency by capping the household’s housing 
budget at a given fraction of its income, so that the remaining income share may cover other expenses. 
As long as the CH constraint is moderate, the solvency effect does operate and we see an improvement 
in the solvency of both low- and high-income households. If the CH constraint is too strong however, 
low-income households are progressively evicted from the central parts of the city and thus face a 
strong increase in their transport costs. As a result, their solvency deteriorates instead of improving. 
This phenomenon does not occur if 𝑠0 = 0 however, as the eviction mechanism does not operate 
(Proposition 1). This leads us to the following conjecture. 
Conjecture 3  
As the CH constraint increases, the mean solvency level of the low-income group rises, then falls at 
some point if 𝑠0 > 0. The range of the solvency level distribution increases then decreases. 
To corroborate Conjecture 3, we illustrate the influence of the CH constraint level on the household 
solvency distribution for our reference model (Figure 7). If 𝛿?̅?  is low, the CH requirement is loose and 
no household is constrained: the solvency level distribution remains constant. As 𝛿?̅? increases, the CH 
requirement becomes stricter. Low-income households are affected first, then high-income ones too. 
For each income class, the solvency level of the households closest to the city center starts to improve, 
which raises the mean and maximum solvency levels, but not the minimum. At first, the improvement 
of household solvency therefore comes with a rise in inequality (evidenced by the increase in the range 
of the solvency distribution). As 𝛿?̅? increases further, all households are constrained and the minimum 
solvency level eventually starts to increase. This also causes the range of solvency levels to decrease.  
 
FIGURE 7: INFLUENCE OF THE CH CONSTRAINT LEVEL ON HOUSEHOLD SOLVENCY 
For each Figure, the plain line represents the mean solvency level of the considered income class, whereas the lower and upper dashed lines represent 
the minimum and maximum solvency levels, respectively. The solvency level is measured either in nominal value (a) or as a fraction of income (b). 
(a) Nominal value (b) % of income 
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At some point however, the eviction effect takes place and the solvency of low-income households 
starts to deteriorate. Conversely, high-income households benefit from a marked improvement in their 
solvency as they move to the central parts of the city. Finally, when 𝛿?̅? nears its maximum value, the 
eviction mechanism de facto ceases as low-income households have been pushed to the city outskirts, 
and the solvency of both income categories improves again. 
6 Analysis of CHT prudential measures 
We now consider the alternative measure that caps the housing plus transport (CHT) expense ratio. 
As previously, we first review the basic properties of the CHT monocentric model in subsection 6.1, 
then investigate the effects of CH prudential measures on low-income households in subsection 6.2.  
A tilde symbol “~” is used when necessary to refer to variables in the CHT case. 
6.1. The CHT monocentric model 
CHT prudential measures institute the following constraint on the household budget allocation: 
 ∀𝑟 ∈ ℝ+,  ?̃?𝐻𝑇(𝑟) ≤ 𝛿𝐻𝑇 . (13) 
The joint housing plus transport expense ratio is capped at a fraction 𝛿𝐻𝑇 of the household income. 
Using the household budget constraint, (13) can be rewritten as: 
 ?̃?𝑧(𝑟) ≥ 𝛿?̅?𝑇 , (14) 
where 𝛿?̅?𝑇 = 1 − 𝛿𝐻𝑇. In other words, 𝛿?̅?𝑇 sets the minimum solvency level, i.e. the minimum income 
share that must remain available for the sole consumption of the z composite good. Like in Section 5, 
we will henceforward use the parameter 𝛿?̅?𝑇 instead of 𝛿𝐻𝑇 to characterize the CHT constraint level. 
Starting from 𝛿?̅?𝑇 = 0, which corresponds to the unregulated (or unconstrained) case, the constraint 
becomes stronger as 𝛿?̅?𝑇 increases, with 𝛿?̅?𝑇 ≤ 1.  
6.1.1 Constrained zone 
Unlike CH measures, CHT prudential measures firstly target distant households. 
Lemma 4  
The constrained zone is a ring {𝑟 ∈ ℝ+| 𝑟 ≥ 𝑟𝑐(𝛿?̅?𝑇)}. The inner boundary 𝑟𝑐(𝛿?̅?𝑇) increases with 
income 𝑌  and decreases with 𝛿?̅?𝑇.  
Proof 
See Appendix.                     
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The constrained zone is an outer ring at first, only households living far from the CBD being affected. 
As 𝛿?̅?𝑇 increases further, the constraint becomes stronger, until all households are eventually affected. 
Moreover, all other things equal, low-income households are more likely to be limited by the CHT 
prudential ratio than high-income households. 
6.1.2 Bid-max variables 
In the CHT monocentric model, the bid-max variables are given by: 
 
{
 
 
 
 ?̃?(𝑟, 𝑢) = max[𝑧(𝑟, 𝑢) ,  𝛿?̅?𝑇𝑌],                                      
?̃?(𝑟, 𝑢) = min [𝑠(𝑟, 𝑢) , 𝑠0 + 𝑢
1
𝛼(𝛿?̅?𝑇𝑌 − 𝑧0)
𝛼−1
𝛼 ],    
Ψ̃(𝑟, 𝑢) = min[Ψ(𝑟, 𝑢) , (𝛿𝐻𝑇𝑌 − 𝑎𝑟)/?̃?(𝑟, 𝑢)].        
 (15) 
Like CH prudential measures, CHT prudential measures lead to smaller home sizes, lower bid rents, 
and greater consumptions of the z composite good. More specifically, CHT measures de facto enforce 
both a maximum home size and a minimum solvency level: from (15), ?̃?(𝑟, 𝑢) and ?̃?(𝑟, 𝑢) are constant 
(with respect to 𝑟) within the constrained zone. Furthermore, within the constrained zone we have 
Ψ̃𝑟(𝑟, 𝑢) = −𝑎/?̃?(𝑟, 𝑢). This implies that Muth’s relationship: 
?̃?′(𝑟) = −
𝑇′(𝑟)
?̃?(𝑟, 𝑢)
  ∀𝑟 ∈ [0, 𝑟?̃?[ 
remains true in the CHT case. This key property makes the algebra much simpler than in the CH case. 
In particular, it makes the formal derivation of the equilibrium solution feasible.  
 Figure 8 illustrates these various points in the case of our reference numerical application and 
of the low-income group for 𝛿?̅?𝑇 = 0.4 and  𝑢 = 206.559.
24 
6.1.3 Income sorting 
Using Muth’s relationship, we can show that the two income classes appear in the same order as 
in the unconstrained case. 
Proposition 2  
CHT prudential measures preserve the natural income sorting order: low-income households live in the 
central part of the city, whereas high-income households live in a suburban ring. 
Proof 
See Appendix.                    
                                                          
24 The value 𝑢 = 206.559 corresponds to the equilibrium utility of the low-income group in the single class case, 
i.e. when 𝑁𝑃 = 1 and 𝑁𝑅 = 0. 
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FIGURE 8 : INFLUENCE OF THE CHT CONSTRAINT AND OF LOCATION ON BID-MAX VARIABLES                                             
Unlike CH prudential measures, CHT prudential measures do not have the unintended property of 
pushing low-income households toward the periphery. On the contrary, limiting the housing plus 
transport expense ratio induces a centripetal force which attracts distant households toward the CBD, 
where overall housing plus transport costs are lower. 
6.2. Comparative statics 
6.2.1 Household welfare  
Capping the HT expense ratio induces the same two opposite forces as in the CH case: for a given 
level of housing prices the CHT constraint reduces the maximum reachable utility level (direct effect), 
but also leads to lower housing prices at equilibrium, which raises the household equilibrium utility 
(indirect equilibrium effect). The final outcome is provided by Proposition 3. 
(A) Lot size 
& z good 
(B) Bid-rent 
UNCONSTRAINED ZONE CONSTRAINED ZONE 
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Proposition 3  
When the CHT constraint increases, the utility of the low-income group remains constant at first, then 
strictly decreases above a certain threshold 𝛿?̅?𝑇
1 .  
Proof 
See Appendix.                     
Like in the CH case, there are three regimes. If the CHT constraint is too low, it is de facto ineffective 
and the equilibrium situation is the same as in the unregulated case. For moderate values of the CHT 
constraint, we observe an effect on high-income households but not on low-income ones (Figure 9). 
For the latter group, the two opposite forces perfectly compensate each other, and the equilibrium 
utility remains constant. The former benefit from the weaker competition on the housing market, 
hence an increase of their utility level. When the CHT constraint becomes too strong (𝑖. 𝑒. 𝛿?̅?𝑇 > 𝛿?̅?𝑇
1 ), 
the direct negative effect starts to prevail and the utility of the low-income group falls. Regarding the 
high-income group, the utility level keeps increasing at first, then may or may not also fall depending 
on the income differential between the two groups. Here, the income differential remains moderate, 
so that the utility of the high-income class also falls when the CHT constraint is excessively strong. 
 
FIGURE 9: INFLUENCE OF THE CHT CONSTRAINT LEVEL ON EQUILIBRIUM UTILITIES 
6.2.2 Household solvency 
Unlike CH prudential measures, CHT prudential measures unequivocally improve the solvency of 
low-income households. 
Proposition 4  
Consider the distribution of solvency levels for the low-income class in the CHT monocentric model.          
If the CHT constraint increases, the mean increases while the range decreases.   
Utility 
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Proof 
See Appendix.                    
Proposition 4 is almost tautological. Indeed, the CHT constraint directly bears on the solvency level 
(based on our definition of this notion) as indicated by (14). It is quite intuitive that increasing the CHT 
constraint would then improve household solvency. Because of non-trivial equilibrium effects though, 
this point was not as obvious as it seemed and needed to be properly established. Besides, the fact 
that the range of the distribution of solvency levels decreases proves that CHT prudential measures 
are especially efficient in improving household solvency. In addition to raising the mean solvency level, 
they also lead to more uniform levels across households hence a better control of risk (Figure 10). 
 
FIGURE 10: INFLUENCE OF THE CHT CONSTRAINT LEVEL ON HOUSEHOLD SOLVENCY 
7 Exploring the influence of variations in transport costs 
 We have assumed in the previous sections that transport costs are the same for all households, 
and are constant over time. This section further investigates the role of transport costs by examining 
these two assumptions. As a matter of fact, one of the main arguments in favor of CHT policies is that 
they supposedly protect low-income households from fuel price spikes. We investigate this first point 
by considering the effects of an increase in transport costs. Secondly, the assumption of homogeneous 
transport costs is challenged by the fact that low-income households may develop strategies to cut 
transport costs (ride sharing, car sharing...). We examine to what extent our conclusions are modified 
when accounting for this possibility by considering heterogeneous transport costs. 
(a) Nominal value (b) % of income 
For each Figure, the plain line represents the mean solvency level of the considered income class, whereas the lower and upper dashed lines represent 
the minimum and maximum solvency levels, respectively. The solvency level is measured either in nominal value (a) or as a fraction of income (b). 
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7.1. Increase in transport costs 
Consider an increase in transport costs (caused by higher fuel prices, heavier taxes on transport ...). 
In the short run, we assume housing choices (location and lot size) and housing prices remain constant. 
Households have not adjusted their housing consumption yet as it typically implies a residential move 
(other alternatives include renting part of the house, finding a partner/roommate to share housing 
costs….). Similarly, real estate prices have yet to integrate the new market conditions. Consequently, 
in the short run the increase in transportation costs results in an equivalent loss of residual income, 
which lowers the utility of households and impairs their solvency. In the long run, households may 
modify their housing choices (e.g. by relocating closer to the CBD or opting for a smaller home size), 
to adapt to the new transport costs, while housing prices vary concomitantly according to the observed 
changes in demand. 
To illustrate the effects of such an increase in transport costs, we simulate a doubling of the unit 
transport cost from what would be a low-oil-price scenario (a = 5) to a high-oil-price scenario (a = 10) 
in our reference numerical application. We examine how the initial equilibrium solution (with a = 5) 
varies first in the short run (when housing choices and prices are held constant), then in the long run 
(corresponding to the new equilibrium solution with a = 10) for the CH and CHT cases.  
We first present the CH case, and set the CH constraint level to 𝛿𝐻 = 50%. In the initial situation 
(before the increase in transport costs), low-income households live in the central part of the city, 
between r = 0 and r = 14 (Figure 11). The equilibrium utility is ?̂?𝑒
𝑃 = 54.49, and the solvency level of 
low-income households ranges from 43% to 50%, with a mean solvency level of 46.6% (Table 1). 
Consider now a doubling of unit transport costs. In the short run, housing choices and housing prices 
remain the same: the increase in transport costs leads to an equivalent decrease in residual income. 
Because households far from the CBD (who have greater transport burdens), are more impacted by 
the increase in transport costs than households close to the CBD (who have lower transport burdens), 
households are no longer in equilibrium. The utility of low-income households falls, ranging from 54.49 
for the closest households (at r = 0) to a minimum of 48.36 for the farthest households (at r = 14). 
Concomitantly, the solvency of low-income households deteriorates (Table 1). Again, the most distant 
households are the most impacted, their solvency level falling from 43% to only 36%. In the long-run, 
the situation is actually even worse for low-income households. Given the greater transportation costs, 
each income class seeks to locate closer to the CBD, hence a general increase in bid-rents (Figure 11). 
High-income households, with their greater financial capacity, come out victorious of this bidding war.  
They evict low-income households from the city center, who move toward more distant locations 
(between r=5.9 and r = 18.5). Having to bear both higher housing prices and greater transport costs, 
the new long-run equilibrium utility of the low-income class is 38.29, even lower than in the short run. 
Similarly, solvency levels deteriorate further (Table 1). 
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FIGURE 11: INFLUENCE OF A DOUBLING OF UNIT TRANSPORT COSTS ON BID RENTS (CH CASE) 
TABLE 1: INFLUENCE ON THE SOLVENCY OF LOW-INCOME HOUSEHOLDS (CH CASE) 
Solvency level 
(low income group) 
Initial situation 
(low transport costs) 
Short run 
(high transport costs,  
no housing adjustment) 
Long run 
(high transport costs,           
with housing adjustments) 
Mean  46.6% 43.1% 37.9% 
Minimum 43% 36% 31.5% 
Maximum 50% 50% 44.1% 
 
To ensure comparability between the CH and CHT cases, the constraint level is set to 𝛿𝐻𝑇 = 63.4% 
in the CHT case so that the mean solvency level is ultimately the same (46.6%) for both initial situations. 
Like in the CH case, in the initial situation low-income households live in a (smaller) central ring located 
between r = 0 and r = 13.3 (Figure 12). Their equilibrium utility is equal to 49.54. Furthermore, they all 
share the same solvency level of 46.6% (Table 2), resulting from the stringency of the CHT constraint. 
Again, the increase in transport costs causes solvency to deteriorate in the short run. The effect is 
slightly less pronounced than in the CH case, however (with a mean variation of -3.3% against -3.5%). 
The minimum solvency level is markedly higher to boot (40% in the CHT case against 36% in the CH case), 
meaning that CHT policies are likely to limit the number of financially distressed households in the 
short run by mitigating extreme situations. In the long run, the CHT constraint perfectly fulfills its role: 
solvency levels revert back to 46.6% (corresponding to the minimum allowed by the CHT constraint), 
well above the levels observed in the CH case. This is at the price of a significantly lower utility level, 
however (22.38 in the CHT case against 38.29 in the CH case). 
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FIGURE 12: INFLUENCE OF A DOUBLING OF UNIT TRANSPORT COSTS ON BID RENTS (CHT CASE) 
TABLE 2: INFLUENCE ON THE SOLVENCY OF LOW-INCOME HOUSEHOLDS (CHT CASE) 
Solvency level 
(low income group) 
Initial situation 
(low transport costs) 
Short run 
(high transport costs,  
no housing adjustment) 
Long run 
(high transport costs,           
with housing adjustments) 
Mean  46.6% 43.3% 46.6% 
Minimum 46.6% 40% 46.6% 
Maximum 46.6% 46.6% 46.6% 
7.2. Case of heterogeneous transport costs 
We now investigate the case in which low-income households have lower transportation costs than 
high-income households. Indeed, low-income households, given their more limited financial capacity, 
may develop strategies to cut costs such as ride-sharing, car-sharing, resorting more to public transit… 
We consider heterogeneous transport costs in our reference numerical application, with a high unit 
cost for high-income households (aR = 10), and a lower unit cost for low-income households (aP = 5). 
We then compare the equilibrium solution to that found for homogeneous high unit transport costs 
(aP = aR = 10), to see the influence of cost-cutting strategies from low-income households. 
In the CH case, a decrease in unit transport costs for low-income households (only) leads to flatter 
bid-rent curves (Figure 13), as expected (cf. Fujita, 1989). Facing lower transport costs, low-income 
households compete less for locations close to the CBD. They live further in the heterogeneous case 
(between r = 28.2 and r = 43.7) than in the homogeneous case (between r = 5.9 and r = 18.5) as a result. 
Despite enjoying lower unit transport costs, the fact that low-income households live in more distant 
locations in the heterogeneous case causes their solvency to deteriorate (Table 3). In the CHT case, 
similarly the decrease in unit transport costs lead to flatter bid-rent curves. The phenomenon is less 
pronounced however, so that low-income households remain near the city center (Figure 14). 
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Moreover, solvency levels remain unaffected by the change in unit transport costs, as a result of the 
CHT constraint. Let us not that in both the CH and CHT cases, the decrease in unit transport costs for 
low-income households leads to a higher utility level (increasing from 38.29 to 49.26 in the CH case, 
and from 22.38 to 36.73 in the CHT case). 
  
FIGURE 13: INFLUENCE OF HETEROGENEOUS TRANSPORT COSTS ON BID RENTS (CH CASE) 
 
FIGURE 14: INFLUENCE OF HETEROGENEOUS TRANSPORT COSTS ON BID RENTS (CHT CASE) 
TABLE 3: INFLUENCE ON THE SOLVENCY OF LOW-INCOME HOUSEHOLDS (CH AND CHT CASES) 
 
Solvency level 
(low income group) 
CH case CHT case 
Heterogeneous 
transport costs 
(aP = 5, aR = 10) 
Homogeneous 
transport costs 
(aP = aR = 10) 
Heterogeneous 
transport costs 
(aP = 5, aR = 10) 
Homogeneous 
transport costs 
(aP = aR = 10) 
Mean  32.2% 37.9% 46.6% 46.6% 
Minimum 29.1% 31.5% 46.6% 46.6% 
Maximum 35.9% 44.1% 46.6% 46.6% 
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8 Application to Île-de-France 
This section develops a short numerical application to Île-de-France (the French administrative 
region in which Paris is located, and which approximately corresponds to the Paris metropolitan area). 
Rather than providing exact figures, this application intends to illustrate the effects of CH prudential 
measures in a real case study, and appraise the potential benefits of a policy change toward CHT rules. 
The Île-de-France is a particularly relevant case study in various regards. First, CH prudential measures 
are currently enforced, with a maximum housing expense ratio of around 33% (see Section 2). Second, 
the monocentric model is based on the assumption that all jobs are localized at a single point, the CBD. 
This simplifying assumption underlies the model tractability while making the model easy to interpret. 
But it may in practice be relaxed and replaced with the (weaker) assumption that commuting costs T(r) 
increase with distance to the main urban center, regardless of the monocentric or polycentric structure 
of the metropolitan area.25 This is valid for Île-de-France: in the case of median-income households, 
the mean transportation burden rises from 5% in inner Paris to 25% in rural areas for homebuyers, and 
from 6% to 16% for private tenants (Coulombel and Leurent, 2013). Furthermore, the Paris region 
remains strongly monocentric overall, despite few secondary employment centers (Viguié et al., 2014). 
Last but not least, housing is expensive, especially in the central parts of the metro area (and firstly 
Paris), and transport costs in suburban areas are also significant, due to an extensive use of the car. 
Accordingly, CH and CHT policies are likely to matter, especially regarding low-income households. 
To yield more realistic results, we extend the monocentric model with two income classes used in 
the previous sections by introducing the housing industry, in line with the seminal work of Muth (1969). 
This leads us to substitute the basic land supply function 𝐿(𝑟) = 1 with the more complex housing 
supply function 𝐻(𝑟) = 𝜃(𝑟)2𝜋𝑟 ∗ 𝐻0(𝜖𝐻0𝑅𝐻(𝑟)/𝛿)
𝜖
1−𝜖.26 
 Parameter values are collected - or estimated when necessary - from a number of sources and 
correspond to year 2008. We use Census for household population, and fiscal databases from Insee 
(the French national institute for statistics) for the household income distribution in the Paris region. 
The households’ Stone-Geary utility function is estimated using the 2006 French Housing Survey. 
                                                          
25 See Coulombel (2010) for more details on this point. 
26 The first term 𝜃(𝑟)2𝜋𝑟 of the supply equation represents land available at distance r from the CBD (2𝜋𝑟) times 
the share 𝜃(𝑟) of land actually allowed to housing (as opposed to other uses such as offices, retail, transport …). 
The second term 𝐻0(𝜖𝐻0𝑅𝐻(𝑟)/𝛿)
𝜖
1−𝜖 captures the effect of the housing industry which converts land and capital 
into housing supply based on expected housing prices 𝑅𝐻(𝑟), the cost of capital 𝛿, the elasticity of substitution 
between land and capital 𝜖, and a model constant 𝐻0. Again, see Coulombel (2010) for more details. 
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Transport unit costs are derived from Coulombel and Leurent (2013).27 The remaining parameters 
(housing production function, cost of capital) are borrowed from Viguié et al. (2014).28 This leads to 
the following parameter values: NP = NR = 2 431 000, YP = 1 650€, YR = 4 490€, 𝑠0 = 26.7 m², α = 0.136, 
a = 0.014€/km,  𝜃(𝑟) = 0.5𝑒−𝑟/5000, 𝑅𝐴  = 12 €/m², 𝐻0 = 2.014 , ϵ = 0.36 and  = 5%. 
 We first analyze the effects of CH and CHT prudential measures on household solvency. 
Increasing the CH constraint does improve the solvency of low-income households at first (Figure 15). 
But as the CH constraint becomes more stringent (𝛿?̅? ≥ 60%, corresponding to a housing budget no 
greater than 40% of the household income), we observe the same phenomenon as in subsection 5.2.2: 
the mean and the range of the solvency level distribution decreases and increases, respectively. Again, 
this results from the eviction of low-income households from the city center toward suburban areas. 
Let us look at the case 𝛿?̅? = 67%, corresponding to the current CH constraint level in Île-de-France. 
Relatively to the unconstrained case (𝛿?̅? = 0),  low-income households are evicted from inner Paris 
(which is roughly a circle of radius 6 km). They live in a suburban ring located between 10 and 23 km 
from the CBD (Figure 16), where they face higher transportation costs, hence the lower solvency levels. 
The model predicts rent levels around 22€/m² in inner Paris, well matching the observed value of 21.7€ 
for 2008.29 The size of the Paris metropolitan area is slightly underestimated however, with a model 
prediction of only 40 km, against 60 km according to Insee. The phenomenon of leap-frog development 
(Mills, 1981) - not included in our model - might account for the gap between predicted and observed 
values regarding city size. The monocentric model, despite its simplified representation of land use 
and transport, therefore seems to perform reasonably well in the case of the Paris region, justifying its 
use in first-line.30 Unlike CH policies, CHT prudential measures unequivocally improve the solvency of 
low-income households (be it the mean or range), as already observed in subsection 6.2.2 (Proposition 4). 
Again, this results from the key property of CHT constraints, being that they attract distant low-income 
households toward more central, accessible locations, and not the opposite as with CH constraints. 
                                                          
27 The authors compute the mean transport burden for a subdivision in 8 zones of the Greater Paris Region. 
Transport costs include fixed and variable costs for car users, purchase of passes and tickets for transit users, as 
well as potential benefits and tax reductions. A linear regression is performed on their results to produce the 
specification of T(r) used in this application.  
28 Viguié et al. (2014) have successfully calibrated and applied a monocentric model to study energy transition 
scenarios for Île-de-France, so that we can safely borrow most of their parameters. They use a slightly different 
boundary condition from usual, however: 𝑅𝐴 corresponds to the boundary housing rent level (i.e. the reservation 
housing rent below which real estate developers choose not to build) instead of the boundary land rent level. 
We use the same definition of 𝑅𝐴 in our application. 
29 Source: Clameur. 
30 Integrated land-use transport models (ITLUMs) could be used to yield more precise estimates of the effects of 
CH and CHT policies. The calibration and validation of ITLUMs still remains a challenge to this day, however, and 
the complexity of these models does not allow one to follow the economic mechanisms at work as we do here 
with the monocentric model. 
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This point is illustrated in the case of Île-de-France for 𝛿?̅?𝑇 = 53% (which is the CHT equivalent level 
of the CH constraint 𝛿?̅? = 67%, in that they both lead to the same mean solvency level of 53%). Here, 
low-income households are able to remain within the most central parts of the metropolitan area 
(Figure 16), but at the cost of higher housing prices than in the CH case (around 25€/m² near the CBD, 
against 22€/m² in the CH case).  
 
FIGURE 15: INFLUENCE OF CH AND CHT POLICIES ON THE SOLVENCY OF LOW-INCOME HOUSEHOLDS (PARIS REGION) 
 
FIGURE 16: INFLUENCE OF CH AND CHT POLICIES ON BID RENTS AND INCOME SORTING (PARIS REGION) 
Regarding household welfare, the effects of CH and CHT policies are similar to those previously 
observed with the linear city model (in subsections 5.2.1 and 6.2.1, respectively). High-income 
households benefit from the lower housing prices and thus experience higher equilibrium utility levels. 
Conversely, low-income households are more impacted in their choices by the CH and CHT constraints, 
and therefore tend to have lower equilibrium utility levels than in the unconstrained case (Figure A.1). 
For 𝛿?̅? = 67%, which corresponds to the current situation in the Paris region, the equilibrium utility 
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of low-income households is 419.82 in the CH case, against 445.98 in the CHT case for 𝛿?̅?𝑇 = 53%. 
The CHT policy leads in this specific case to a better outcome for low-income households, both in terms 
of solvency and welfare, than the CH policy. Opting for a CHT policy would therefore be doubly 
beneficial in the case of Île-de-France. 
9 Discussion and conclusion 
9.1. Discussion of the main findings 
The analysis of CH and CHT prudential measures has brought to light three main mechanisms: 
 a direct solvency effect: by constraining the household budget allocation, CH and CHT policies 
mechanically improve the solvency of all households for a given level of housing prices; 
 a relocation effect: CH policies have a centrifugal effect and encourage households, especially 
low-income ones, to move away from central, accessible locations and to settle in more distant 
areas with lower housing prices, but at the cost of high overall housing plus transport burdens. 
Conversely, CHT policies have a centripetal effect and incite households to settle in accessible 
neighborhoods, where housing plus transport burdens are low. 
 an equilibrium effect: by limiting the households’ bidding capacity and thus reducing the overall 
housing demand, both policies lead to a decrease in housing prices (through supply/demand 
adjustment mechanisms).  
The direct and equilibrium effects both improve the solvency of all households (whatever their income). 
In the CHT case, the relocation effect also proves beneficial by encouraging locations with low overall 
housing plus transportation costs. As a result, the household solvency unequivocally improves when 
raising the CHT constraint level, be it regarding the mean or the range (Proposition 4). In the CH case, 
the relocation effect has a negative effect on low-income households, who are progressively compelled 
to move toward areas with low housing prices, but high overall housing plus transportation burdens. 
If the CH constraint is moderate, the direct and equilibrium effects are preponderant and household 
solvency improves. If the CH constraint is too strong, the relocation effect prevails and the solvency of 
low-income households worsens (Conjecture 1).31 In the case of the Paris region, we find that the 
current CH rule that caps the housing burden at 33% does indeed evict low-income households from 
the most central parts of the metropolitan area. Replacing it with a CHT rule of equivalent stringency 
(which would cap the housing plus transport burden at 47%) would allow low-income households to 
settle in more central locations with lower transport costs, thereby greatly improving their solvency. 
                                                          
31 In this section we only discuss the case 𝑠0 > 0. If 𝑠0 = 0, the centrifugal effect still exists but is much weaker. 
The direct and equilibrium effects prevail and the solvency of low-income households always increases. 
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Additionally, the relocation effect of CH policies limits the efficiency of cost-cutting travel strategies 
(ride-sharing, car-sharing…), as illustrated in subsection 7.2. Last, CHT policies better protect low-
income households from fuel price spikes (subsection 7.1).   
Regarding household welfare, the direct effect of CH and CHT prudential measures tends to lower 
the equilibrium utility (by constraining households to make sub-optimal choices), while the equilibrium 
effect raises utility by way of lower housing prices.32 Provided that the constraint is not too stringent, 
the welfare of households, firstly of high-income ones (who are less impacted by the direct effect), 
improves as a result. Quite intuitively, the bearish effect on housing prices is stronger in the CH case 
(as the constraint bears directly on housing demand), so that households, again firstly high-income ones, 
are typically better off than under the CHT constraint. In the case of Île-de-France, a policy change from 
the current CH rule (at 33%) to a CHT rule (at 47%) would - in addition to improving their solvency - 
also actually improve the utility of low-income households. High-income households would experience 
a utility loss, however, as expected. 
All in all, CHT prudential measures are efficient to protect the solvency of low-income households, 
whereas CH measures are less efficient in this regard, but improve the welfare of all income categories 
(as long as the constraint remains moderate). Because the primary purpose of prudential measures is 
to improve the solvency of households, not their welfare (which is the role of redistributive policies), 
CHT prudential measures should be preferred to CH rules. Furthermore, CHT measures do not lead to 
the eviction of low-income households from the central (or accessible) areas of the metropolitan area, 
which is another strong undesirable property of CH regulations. 
Our findings are subject to a certain number of caveats. First, a strong assumption in the standard 
monocentric model is that location choices and housing prices are entirely driven by transport costs. 
One consequence of this assumption is that the model predicts that low-income households live near 
the CBD and high-income households in the suburbs. This prediction, though in line with empirical 
observations in the case of several US metropolitan areas, is in contradiction with the prevalence of 
affluent households in Paris. To account for this specificity, Brueckner et al. (1999) bring to light the 
role of amenities, which abound in inner Paris but are scarcer as one moves toward the periphery. 
While amenities are not considered in this paper,33 doing so would only strengthen our findings by 
adding another centrifugal force for low-income households. In the same line, our analysis has focused 
on the monetary costs of travel, in consistency with the design of CH and CHT prudential measures 
                                                          
32 The relocation effect only affects the relative locations of low- and high-income households, with no effect on 
the equilibrium utility level. 
33 See Lemoy et al. (2010) for an operational monocentric model with amenities and several income classes. 
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(which only consider monetary costs). Non-monetary dimensions of travel, firstly travel time, were not 
included in our model. Inasmuch as low-income households have lower values of travel time savings 
than high-income households, taking travel time into account would introduce yet another centrifugal 
force for low-income households, and therefore not change our main findings. 
Second, we have considered only two income classes to keep the model simple. Our findings may 
easily generalize to a continuous income distribution, in which case the effects would progressively 
increase with distance to the median income. For instance, in the CH case the eviction effect would 
affect the poorest households first, then more and more households (raising the income ladder) as the 
constraint level increases. 
Third, social housing is not represented in our model, whereas it is actually part of the solution. 
Indeed, in addition to providing low-income households with affordable housing, it is often located in 
dense, urban areas, with accessible public transit and transport costs that remain relatively low in 
comparison to more suburban or rural areas. Social housing therefore represents a straightforward 
and powerful means to keep low-income households within central, accessible neighborhoods. 
Because social housing is little, if at all, affected by market conditions, we could extend our model by 
considering an exogenous supply of social housing. By doing so, social housing would act as a buffer 
against the eviction effect of CH policies; otherwise, our main conclusions would remain unaltered. 
9.2. Policy recommendations 
Standard economic theory states regulation is needed only in presence of market inefficiencies, 
and is otherwise counterproductive. Based on the literature review and on our findings, we believe 
housing markets are indeed subject to a certain number of inefficiencies, which CHT prudential 
measures may address to some extent. First, households do not fully understand (or correctly appraise) 
the risk of default, and are therefore willing to accept excessive financial burdens (Hanna et al., 2012). 
This is likely to be even truer regarding the housing choice, inasmuch as households may be tempted 
to cross their financial limits to fulfill their social and environmental aspirations (Meissonnier, 2014). 
Furthermore, several works find that households are not perfectly informed of transportation costs; 
in particular, they tend to strongly underestimate the full cost of private cars (Meissonnier, 2014; 
Montagnon and Ringenbach, 2013; Rocci, 2007). Indeed, while information on housing prices is largely 
available ahead of (through real estate websites) and of course during the residential choice process, 
this is yet to be the case for transportation costs.34 Third, given the complexity of fuel price dynamics, 
                                                          
34 While information on travel times is now easily available in most metropolitan areas through trip calculators 
(e.g. Google Maps), information on monetary costs remains seldom and partial at best. 
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there is reason to believe fuel price volatility is largely misunderstood and poorly taken into account. 
Considering all these points, our findings support first using prudential measures in housing access, 
and second integrating transport costs within prudential ratios, and more generally speaking within 
indicators of housing affordability (especially when they are intended to assist households in their 
location decision-making process). In addition to protecting the solvency of low-income households, 
in particular from fuel price spikes, doing so would incidentally raise public awareness with regard to 
transport costs in general, the (high) full cost of private cars, and the issue of fuel price volatility. 
According to Chatman and Voorhoeve (2010), the raising awareness effect of CHT prudential measures 
would even likely be the primary benefit of such measures. 
This leads to the question of the operational feasibility of prudential measures in general, and of 
CHT policies more specifically. As presented in Section 2, CH prudential measures are already applied 
in a number of countries, including the US and France. To do so, information relative to the household 
financial situation - including income - is typically collected from the household itself (information 
relative to housing costs being de facto always readily available to the lender or the landlord). Similarly, 
the concept of CHT prudential measures has already been operationalized in the US under the name 
of Location-Efficient Mortgages and Smart-Commute Mortgages, to which Chatman and Voorhoeve 
(2010) collectively refer as Transportation-Credit Mortgages (TCM). The TCM actually slightly differed 
from the original CHT concept: it raised the loan size for households willing to settle in accessible, 
transit-friendly areas. In other words, TCMs did not seek to directly assess the household’s transport 
budget, but rather to capture the potential travel cost savings through the location accessibility. 
Relying on indirect indicators of the household’s prospective transport burden, they only offered a 
limited amount of additional capital, being one of the reasons why they did not meet great success.35  
Based on this previous experience, we believe CHT prudential measures should be implemented in the 
straightforward way, based on the direct assessment of the household’s prospective transport costs. 
Doing so requires two things: 1) collecting all the necessary information to be able to estimate the 
future household’s transport budget, and 2) having the appropriate tool to do the actual estimation. 
Regarding point 1), useful information includes by order of relevance: workplace(s) of household’s 
members, number of cars, and ideally some information on the household’s travel behavior 
(ridesharing, propensity to use public transit, frequency of commuting and non-commuting trips, …). 
Workplace would in most cases be straightforwardly available to lenders or landlords, as they usually 
require information on the employer, job tenure, pay stubs… Information on the number of cars is 
partly available to lenders in case of car credit. Otherwise, it could be easily asked from households. 
                                                          
35 See Chatman and Voorhoeve (2010) for an informative discussion on the US experience of TCMs. 
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Regarding the household’s travel behavior, collecting this information could be done in the case of 
lenders during one of the many appointments, but would likely be harder in the case of landlords. 
Relatively to point 2), transport budget calculators remain few and mostly stem from the academic 
community as for now. Among the existing initiatives, the Center for Neighborhood Technology has 
developed one such calculator in the US, while two tools, E-Mob and Mobicost (the latter as part of 
the MORECO European project), have already been developed in France.36 In the absence of such tools, 
simple estimates could be derived by first estimating mode choice through the comparison of travel 
times by car, public transit, and active modes (which again is usually easily available through online 
trip calculators), then computing a tentative budget using a unit cost per kilometer in the case of car, 
the cost of the appropriate transit pass in the case of public transit… Let us stress that the objective of 
CHT prudential measures would not be to completely control the household’s transport expenditures. 
Like for current CH prudential measures, one would verify that the CHT constraint is satisfied before 
the residential move, but following the residential move it would be really hard to track and control 
the household’s travel behavior and the ensuing travel expenses. Rather, CHT prudential measures 
(like CH ones) would be intended as much as a way to limit the risk of insolvency that as a way to raise 
households’ awareness to the risk of carrying excessive burdens. By putting forward this educational 
goal, information relative to travel behaviors could likely be collected more easily from households. 
Last, CHT initiatives could be profitably supported by transit authorities by providing temporary free 
transit passes to low-income households locating in transit-friendly areas thanks to these initiatives. 
This was experimented in the US as part of the TCM program, and was deemed very attractive by the 
households who enjoyed the free transit passes (Chatman and Voorhoeve, 2010). 
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Appendix A - Proofs 
Proofs for Section 2 
Bid-max variables 
The Lagrangian corresponding to the bid-max problem (2) is: 
ℒ =
𝑌 − 𝑇(𝑟) − 𝑧
𝑠
+ 𝜆((𝑠 − 𝑠0)
(𝑧 − 𝑧0)
1− − 𝑢). 
First-order optimality conditions (FOC) are: 
{
−
1
𝑠
+ 𝜆(1 − 𝛼)(𝑠 − 𝑠0)
(𝑧 − 𝑧0)
− = 0
−
𝑌 − 𝑇(𝑟) − 𝑧
𝑠2
+ 𝜆𝛼(𝑠 − 𝑠0)
−1(𝑧 − 𝑧0)
1− = 0.
 
Combining the two FOC yields: (𝑧 − 𝑧0)/(1 − 𝛼) = Ψ(𝑟, 𝑢)(𝑠 − 𝑠0)/𝛼. Using the household budget 
constraint, we get: 
 
{
𝑠(𝑟, 𝑢) = 𝑠0 + 𝛼
(𝑌 − 𝑧0 − 𝑎𝑟 − Ψ(𝑟, 𝑢)𝑠0)
Ψ(𝑟, 𝑢)
,                  
𝑧(𝑟, 𝑢) = 𝑧0 + (1 − 𝛼)(𝑌 − 𝑧0 − 𝑎𝑟 − Ψ(𝑟, 𝑢)𝑠0).
 (16) 
Substituting (16) in the bid-max constraint (𝑠 − 𝑠0)
(𝑧 − 𝑧0)
1− = 𝑢 provides the last relationship:  
𝑢Ψ(𝑟, 𝑢)𝛼 + 𝐴𝑠0Ψ(𝑟, 𝑢) = A(𝑌 − 𝑧0 − 𝑎𝑟), 
with 𝐴 = 𝛼𝛼(1 − 𝛼)1−𝛼. 
Proof of Lemma 1 
The derivative of the housing burden is 𝜏𝐻′(𝑟) = ((1 − 𝛼)𝑅′(𝑟)𝑠0 − 𝛼𝑎)/𝑌. Given that 𝑅′(𝑟) < 0, 
we have 𝜏𝐻′(𝑟) < 0. For the housing plus transport burden, we have 𝜏𝐻𝑇′(𝑟) = −𝜏𝑧′(𝑟) > 0 according 
to the properties of 𝑧(𝑟, 𝑢) stated above. 
Proof of Lemma 2 
The joint HT burden 𝜏𝐻𝑇(𝑟) is a linear function of  1/𝑌 with coefficient (1 − 𝛼)(𝑅(𝑟)𝑠0 + 𝑎𝑟) − 𝛼𝑧0. 
As ∀𝑟 ∈ ℝ+, 𝑅(𝑟) ≥ 𝑅𝐴, we have (1 − 𝛼)(𝑅(𝑟)𝑠0 + 𝑎𝑟) − 𝛼𝑧0 ≥ (1 − 𝛼)𝑅𝐴𝑠0 − 𝛼𝑧0 ≥ 0 based on 
the assumption from 3.3. This shows that 𝜏𝐻𝑇(𝑟) decreases with Y for all 𝑟 ∈ ℝ
+. 
The housing expense ratio is also an hyperbola in 𝑌, but its coefficient (1 − 𝛼)𝑅(𝑟)𝑠0 − 𝛼𝑧0 − 𝛼𝑎𝑟 
switches sign for 𝑟 ≥ 𝑟𝐻 , where 𝑟𝐻 is implicitly defined by (1 − 𝛼)𝑅(𝑟𝐻)𝑠0 = 𝛼(𝑧0 + 𝑎𝑟𝐻). As a result, 
the housing burden decreases with Y if 𝑟 ≤ 𝑟𝐻, but increases for 𝑟 ≥ 𝑟𝐻. In the limiting case 𝑠0 = 0,  
the threshold 𝑟𝐻 = 0, and the housing burden always increases with income, whatever the location. 
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Proofs for Section 3 
Proof of Lemma 3 
The constrained zone is the set of locations where the unconstrained housing expense ratio exceeds 
the authorized limit: {𝑟 ∈ ℝ+/𝜏𝐻(𝑟) ≥ 𝛿𝐻}. It is the preimage of [𝛿𝐻 , 1] under the function 𝜏𝐻(. ). 
Because 𝜏𝐻(𝑟) decreases with r (Lemma 1), the constrained zone has the form {𝑟 ∈ ℝ
+/𝑟 ≤ ?̂?𝑐(𝛿𝐻)}, 
where ?̂?𝑐(𝛿𝐻) decreases with 𝛿𝐻. Using 𝛿?̅? = 1 − 𝛿𝐻, this means that ?̂?𝑐(𝛿?̅?) increases with 𝛿?̅?.    
Assume 𝑠0 = 0.  The unconstrained housing burden 𝜏𝐻(𝑟) increases with Y at all locations (Lemma 2). 
This implies that ?̂?𝑐(𝛿?̅?) also increases with 𝑌.     
Proposition 1 and Conjecture 1 
We first prove Proposition 1, then sketch the proof of Conjecture 1. 
Assume 𝑠0 = 0. Following Fujita (1989), the income sorting order depends on the relative steepness 
of the bid rent functions of the two income classes. Let ?̂?𝑃/𝑅 be one of the possibly many frontier points 
between these two classes. At ?̂?𝑃/𝑅, there are three alternatives: A) no income group is constrained,      
B) the low-income group is constrained, and C) both income groups are constrained. Given Lemma 3, 
the last possibility where the high-income class is constrained but not the low-income one never arises. 
We are going to show that |Ψ̂𝑟
𝑅(?̂?𝑃/𝑅 , ?̂?𝑒
𝑅)| < |Ψ̂𝑟
𝑃(?̂?𝑃/𝑅 , ?̂?𝑒
𝑃)| in all three alternatives. 
Case A corresponds to the unconstrained situation, with |Ψ̂𝑟
𝑃(?̂?𝑃/𝑅 , ?̂?𝑒
𝑃)| = |Ψ𝑟
𝑃(?̂?𝑃/𝑅 , ?̂?𝑒
𝑃)| and 
|Ψ̂𝑟
𝑅(?̂?𝑃/𝑅 , ?̂?𝑒
𝑅)| = |Ψ𝑟
𝑅(?̂?𝑃/𝑅 , ?̂?𝑒
𝑅)|, in which case |Ψ𝑟
𝑅| < |Ψ𝑟
𝑃| is a well-known property (Fujita, 1989).  
In case B, the high-income class is unconstrained: |Ψ̂𝑟
𝑅| = |Ψ𝑟
𝑅| = 𝑎/ŝ𝑅. Because of the Stone-Geary 
utility function, we have 𝑅(?̂?𝑃/𝑅)ŝ
𝑅/𝛼 = (?̂?𝑅 − 𝑧0)/(1 − 𝛼) hence |Ψ̂𝑟
𝑅| =
1−𝛼
𝛼
𝑎𝑅(?̂?𝑃/𝑅)/(?̂?
𝑅 − 𝑧0). 
Regarding the low-income class, which is constrained, we have |Ψ̂𝑟
𝑃| =
1−𝛼
𝛼
𝑎𝛿𝐻𝑌
𝑃/(ŝ𝑃 ∗ (?̂?𝑃 − 𝑧0)) 
from (12). We also have 𝑅(?̂?𝑃/𝑅)ŝ
𝑃 = 𝛿𝐻𝑌
𝑃, entailing |Ψ̂𝑟
𝑃| =
1−𝛼
𝛼
𝑎𝑅(?̂?𝑃/𝑅)/(?̂?
𝑃 − 𝑧0). All in all, 
|Ψ̂𝑟
𝑃| > |Ψ̂𝑟
𝑅| ⟺ ?̂?𝑃 < ?̂?𝑅. The low-income class is constrained hence ?̂?𝑃 = 𝛿?̅?𝑌
𝑃 − 𝑎?̂?𝑃/𝑅, while the 
high-income class is not meaning that ?̂?𝑅 > 𝛿?̅?𝑌
𝑅 − 𝑎?̂?𝑃/𝑅 > 𝛿?̅?𝑌
𝑃 − 𝑎?̂?𝑃/𝑅 = ?̂?
𝑃.  
In case C, both income groups are constrained. Again, we have|Ψ̂𝑟
𝑃| =
1−𝛼
𝛼
𝑎𝑅(?̂?𝑃/𝑅)/(?̂?
𝑃 − 𝑧0) and 
|Ψ̂𝑟
𝑅| =
1−𝛼
𝛼
𝑎𝑅(?̂?𝑃/𝑅)/(?̂?
𝑅 − 𝑧0) from (12), hence the equivalence |Ψ̂𝑟
𝑃| > |Ψ̂𝑟
𝑅| ⟺ ?̂?𝑃 < ?̂?𝑅. Because 
the two income groups are constrained, we have ?̂?𝑅 = 𝛿?̅?𝑌
𝑅 − 𝑎?̂?𝑃/𝑅 > 𝛿?̅?𝑌
𝑃 − 𝑎?̂?𝑃/𝑅 = ?̂?
𝑃, which 
concludes the proof of Proposition 1. 
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Now assume 𝑠0 > 0. As discussed in 5.1.1, the unconstrained housing burden 𝜏𝐻(𝑟) decreases with Y 
near the CBD but increases with Y beyond. Contrary to the case 𝑠0 = 0, low-income households are 
more impacted than high-income ones near the CBD. 
In case A, the two income groups are unconstrained. As previously, |Ψ̂𝑟
𝑃| = |Ψ𝑟
𝑃| > |Ψ𝑟
𝑅| = |Ψ̂𝑟
𝑅|. 
When the CH constraint is weak, the relative location of the two income groups remains unchanged. 
Things do change in case B, however. For the high-income group, we still have |Ψ̂𝑟
𝑅| = |Ψ𝑟
𝑅| = 𝑎/ŝ𝑅. 
Because 𝑠0 > 0, the Stone-Geary property writes 𝑅(?̂?𝑃/𝑅)(ŝ
𝑅 − 𝑠0)/𝛼 = (?̂?
𝑅 − 𝑧0)/(1 − 𝛼), yielding 
|Ψ̂𝑟
𝑅| =
1−𝛼
𝛼
𝑎𝑅(?̂?𝑃/𝑅)(ŝ
𝑅 − 𝑠0)/ŝ
𝑅 ∗ 1/(?̂?𝑅 − 𝑧0). Regarding the low-income class, we now have 
|Ψ̂𝑟
𝑃| =
1−𝛼
𝛼
𝑎𝛿𝐻𝑌
𝑃(ŝ𝑃 − 𝑠0)/(ŝ
𝑃)2 ∗ 1/(?̂?𝑃 − 𝑧0). Using the CH constraint  𝑅(?̂?𝑃/𝑅)ŝ
𝑃 = 𝛿𝐻𝑌
𝑃 yields 
|Ψ̂𝑟
𝑃| =
1−𝛼
𝛼
𝑎𝑅(?̂?𝑃/𝑅)(ŝ
𝑃 − 𝑠0)/ŝ
𝑃 ∗ 1/(?̂?𝑃 − 𝑧0). The relative steepness of the two bid rent functions 
is therefore given by the following condition: 
|Ψ̂𝑟
𝑃| ⋛ |Ψ̂𝑟
𝑅| ⟺ (?̂?𝑃 − 𝑧0) ∗
ŝ𝑃
ŝ𝑃 − 𝑠0
⋚ (?̂?𝑅 − 𝑧0) ∗
ŝ𝑅
ŝ𝑅 − 𝑠0
. 
Although we still have ?̂?𝑃 − 𝑧0 < ?̂?
𝑅 − 𝑧0, regarding the second factor we have ŝ
𝑃 < ŝ𝑅 ⟹
ŝ𝑃/(ŝ𝑃 − 𝑠0) > ŝ
𝑅/(ŝ𝑅 − 𝑠0). Thus, the order relationship between |Ψ̂𝑟
𝑃| and |Ψ̂𝑟
𝑅|  is undetermined. 
As the CH constraint level increases and  ŝ𝑃 tends toward 𝑠0, the term ŝ
𝑃/(ŝ𝑃 − 𝑠0) tends toward +∞, 
which leads |Ψ̂𝑟
𝑃| < |Ψ̂𝑟
𝑅|. This implies that as 𝛿?̅? increases the relative steepness of the two bid rent 
functions should switch at some point, causing low-income households to be evicted from the city center. 
Although we could not establish this point formerly (in particular because the analytical derivation of 
the equilibrium utility in the CH monocentric model with two income classes could not be achieved), 
this is indeed what we observe numerically, hence Conjecture 1.        
Proofs for the CHT monocentric model 
Proof of Lemma 4 
The constrained zone is the set of locations where the unconstrained housing plus transport expense 
ratio exceeds the authorized limit: {𝑟 ∈ ℝ+/𝜏𝐻𝑇(𝑟) ≥ 𝛿𝐻𝑇}. Equivalently, it is the preimage of [𝛿𝐻𝑇 , 1] 
under the function 𝜏𝐻𝑇(. ). Because 𝜏𝐻𝑇(𝑟) increases with r (Lemma 1), the constrained zone has the 
form {𝑟 ∈ ℝ+/𝑟 ≥ 𝑟𝑐
𝑖(𝛿𝐻𝑇)}, where 𝑟𝑐
𝑖(𝛿𝐻𝑇) increases with 𝛿𝐻𝑇. Using 𝛿?̅?𝑇 = 1 − 𝛿𝐻𝑇, this means that 
𝑟𝑐
𝑖(𝛿?̅?𝑇) decreases with 𝛿?̅?𝑇. Similarly, 𝜏𝐻𝑇(𝑟) decreases with income (Lemma 2), which implies that 
𝑟𝑐
𝑖(𝛿?̅?𝑇) increases with 𝑌.   
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Proof of Proposition 2 
Following Fujita (1989), the income sorting order depends on the relative steepness of the bid rent 
functions of the two income classes. Let ?̃?𝑃/𝑅 be one of the possibly many frontier points between the 
two income classes. At 𝑟𝑃/𝑅, we have: 
Ψ̃𝑟
ℎ(?̃?𝑃/𝑅 , ?̃?𝑒
ℎ) = −
𝑎
?̃?ℎ(?̃?𝑃/𝑅 , ?̃?𝑒
ℎ)
  ∀ℎ ∈ {𝑃, 𝑅}. 
If ?̃?𝑃(?̃?𝑃/𝑅 , ?̃?𝑒
𝑃) < ?̃?𝑅(?̃?𝑃/𝑅 , ?̃?𝑒
𝑅) the bid rent function of the low-income class is steeper than that of 
the high income class, and vice versa. There are three possibilities: A) no income class is constrained, 
B) the low-income class is constrained, and C) both income classes are constrained. Given Lemma 2, 
the last possibility where the high-income class is constrained but not the low-income one never arises. 
We are now going to show that ?̃?𝑃 < ?̃?𝑅 in all three alternatives (the r and u arguments being omitted 
for concision), meaning that the bid rent function of low-income households is always steeper than 
that of high-income households, which will conclude the proof. 
Case A corresponds to the unconstrained situation, with ?̃?𝑃 = 𝑠𝑃 and ?̃?𝑅 = s𝑅. In this case, the 
inequality 𝑠𝑃 < s𝑅 stems from the assumption that land is a normal good (Fujita, 1989).  
In case B, we have ?̃?𝑃 < 𝑠𝑃 (from (15)) and ?̃?𝑅 = s𝑅, hence ?̃?𝑃 < ?̃?𝑅 using again 𝑠𝑃 < s𝑅. 
In case C, both income classes are constrained, hence ∀ℎ ∈ {𝑃, 𝑅}, 𝑅(?̃?𝑃/𝑅)?̃?
ℎ + 𝑎?̃?𝑃/𝑅 = 𝛿𝐻𝑇𝑌
ℎ  . 
This implies ?̃?ℎ = (𝛿𝐻𝑇𝑌
ℎ − 𝑎?̃?𝑃/𝑅)/𝑅(?̃?𝑃/𝑅). Because 𝑌
𝑃 < 𝑌𝑅 , ?̃?𝑃 < ?̃?𝑅 is straightforward.     
Proof of Proposition 3 
There are three different regimes depending on the level of the CHT constraint. During the first regime 
(0 ≤ 𝛿?̅?𝑇 ≤ 𝛿?̅?𝑇
0 ), the CHT constraint is ineffective: none of the low-income households is constrained. 
We are in the unconstrained situation, hence: 
{
 
 ?̃?𝑒
𝑃(𝛿?̅?𝑇) = 𝐴
𝑌𝑃 − 𝑧0 − (𝑅𝐴 + 𝑎𝑁)𝑠0
(𝑅𝐴 + 𝑎𝑁)𝛼
                                              
?̃?𝑃/𝑅(𝛿?̅?𝑇) =
1
𝑎
((1 − 𝐾𝛼)(𝑌𝑃 − 𝑧0) + (𝐾
𝛼 − 𝐾)(𝑅𝐴 + 𝑎𝑁)𝑠0)
, 
with 𝐾 =
𝑅𝐴+𝑎𝑁
𝑅
𝑅𝐴+𝑎𝑁
∈ ]0; 1[. The equilibrium utility level ?̃?𝑒
𝑃(𝛿?̅?𝑇) of the low-income group and the size 
?̃?𝑃/𝑅(𝛿?̅?𝑇) of its residential area are both independent of 𝛿?̅?𝑇, and thereby constant. The first regime 
ends when the household living at the border ?̃?𝑃/𝑅 becomes constrained. This occurs when: 
𝑧(?̃?𝑃/𝑅 , ?̃?𝑒
𝑃) = 𝑧0 +𝐾
𝛼(1 − 𝛼)(𝑌𝑃 − 𝑧0 − (𝑅𝐴 + 𝑎𝑁)𝑠0) = 𝛿?̅?𝑇
0 𝑌𝑃 , 
⟺ 𝛿?̅?𝑇
0 = 𝐾𝛼(1 − 𝛼) −
𝐾𝛼(1 − 𝛼)(𝑧0 + (𝑅𝐴 + 𝑎𝑁)𝑠0) − 𝑧0
𝑌𝑃
. 
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In the second regime (with 𝛿?̅?𝑇
0 ≤ 𝛿?̅?𝑇 ≤ 𝛿?̅?𝑇
1 ), the CHT constraint is stronger and starts to be effective: 
the most remote low-income households are affected, whereas those living near the CBD are not (yet). 
For the household living at 𝑟 = 0, the market conditions remain the same as in the unconstrained case, 
meaning that the equilibrium utility level does not change, with ?̃?𝑒
𝑃(𝛿?̅?𝑇) = 𝐴
𝑌𝑃−𝑧0−(𝑅𝐴+𝑎𝑁)𝑠0
(𝑅𝐴+𝑎𝑁)𝛼
. As the 
most remote households are constrained, the size of the low-income area starts to decrease, however. 
Using 𝑅(?̃?𝑃/𝑅) = 𝑅𝐴 + 𝑎𝑁
𝑅 and 𝜏𝐻𝑇
𝑃 (?̃?𝑃/𝑅) = 𝛿𝐻𝑇, the limit of the low-income ring is now given by: 
?̃?𝑃/𝑅(𝛿?̅?𝑇) =
1
𝑎
(𝛿𝐻𝑇𝑌
𝑃 − (𝑅𝐴 + 𝑎𝑁
𝑅) (𝑠0 + ?̃?𝑒
𝑃
1
𝛼(𝛿?̅?𝑇𝑌
𝑃 − 𝑧0)
𝛼−1
𝛼 )). 
To show that when the CHT constraint becomes stronger (i.e. 𝛿?̅?𝑇 decreases),  ?̃?𝑃/𝑅(𝛿?̅?𝑇) decreases, 
rather than deriving the previous relationship, which proves quite tedious, we use a simple argument. 
In the second regime, when 𝛿?̅?𝑇 increases, because utility remains constant, lot size decreases at all 
constrained locations (from (15)). Given the population constraint ∫ 1/s̃𝑃(𝑟, ?̃?𝑒
𝑃)𝑑𝑟
?̃?𝑃/𝑅
0
= 𝑁𝑃 for the 
low-income group, the fact that s̃𝑃(𝑟, ?̃?𝑒
𝑃) decreases at all constrained locations implies that ?̃?𝑃/𝑅(𝛿?̅?𝑇) 
strictly decreases. The second regime ends when the household living at the CBD becomes constrained, 
which occurs when:  
𝑧(0, ?̃?𝑒
𝑃) = 𝛿?̅?𝑇
1 𝑌𝑃 ⟺ 𝛿?̅?𝑇
1 = 1 − 𝛼 − ((1 − 𝛼)(𝑅𝐴 + 𝑎𝑁)𝑠0 − 𝛼𝑧0)/𝑌
𝑃 . 
In the last regime (with 𝛿?̅?𝑇 > 𝛿?̅?𝑇
1 ), all households are constrained. Again, we first consider the 
household living at the CBD. Using (15) and 𝑅(0) = 𝑅𝐴 + 𝑎𝑁, we have : 
?̃?𝑒
𝑃(𝛿?̅?𝑇) = (
𝛿𝐻𝑇𝑌
𝑃
𝑅𝐴 + 𝑎𝑁
− 𝑠0)
𝛼
(𝛿?̅?𝑇𝑌
𝑃 − 𝑧0)
1−𝛼
. 
By deriving the above formula, it is straightforward to show that ?̃?𝑒
𝑃(𝛿?̅?𝑇) strictly decreases with 𝛿?̅?𝑇. 
The size of the low-income residential area is given by the same equation as in the second regime. 
Using the same rationale as before (added to the fact that because utility decreases, lot sizes decrease 
even more), the size of the low-income area also strictly decreases in the third regime. 
Proof of Proposition 4 
Consider the same three regimes as in the proof of Proposition 3. In the first regime, the CHT constraint 
is ineffective, so both the mean and the range of solvency levels remain constant. 
In the second regime, utility remains constant. When 𝛿?̅?𝑇 increases, ?̃?(𝑟, ?̃?𝑒
𝑃) strictly increases for all 
constrained households and remains constant for unconstrained households (from (15)). Therefore, 
the mean solvency level increases while the range decreases. 
In the last regime, all households are constrained. Again from (15), the solvency level is the same for 
all households and equal to 𝛿?̅?𝑇. The mean is thus also 𝛿?̅?𝑇 while the range is null.       
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Appendix B – Figures 
 
FIGURE A.1: INFLUENCE OF CH AND CHT POLICIES ON HOUSEHOLD UTILITY (PARIS REGION) 
 
CH case CHT case 
